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ARE THE SEC’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
BIASED? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Urska Velikonja* 
Abstract: The Dodd-Frank Act significantly expanded the SEC’s enforcement flexibility 
by authorizing the agency to choose whether to bring an enforcement action in court or in an 
administrative proceeding. The change has faced strong opposition. Federal courts have 
enjoined several enforcement actions filed in administrative proceedings for constitutional 
infirmities, and cases are currently winding their way through the appellate process. But even 
if any constitutional problems were remedied, controversy would persist. Judges, lawmakers, 
practitioners, and academics have raised doubts as to whether litigation before administrative 
law judges (“ALJs”) is fair to defendants. In advancing their arguments, they have relied 
heavily on a series of reports published in the Wall Street Journal purporting to show that the 
SEC enjoys a home-court advantage in litigation before ALJs. 
As documented in this Article, the evidence offered by the Wall Street Journal is 
deficient and its conclusions unfounded. This Article compiles and analyzes a large dataset of 
all enforcement actions filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015. Contrary to the claim advanced by 
the Wall Street Journal and critics of administrative adjudication, SEC litigation before ALJs 
remains rare. Although the number of contested actions filed in the administrative forum has 
increased since Dodd-Frank, this is mostly due to an increase in actions that could have been 
litigated before ALJs prior to the Dodd-Frank amendment. More significantly, there is no 
robust correlation between the selected forum and case outcome. Federal district court judges 
ruled for the SEC and against defendants in 88% of cases, whereas ALJs ruled for the SEC in 
90% of cases. This finding does not imply that the type of forum in which the SEC litigates 
does not matter. Rather, there are significant empirical obstacles to finding any useful results 
by comparing case outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
celebrated a confidence-boosting victory after a jury trial of the 
“Fabulous Fab,” Goldman Sachs’s trader Fabrice Tourre, who was found 
liable for defrauding investors in mortgage securities.1 A series of 
stinging trial defeats for the SEC followed that victory. First, Mark 
Cuban prevailed after a much-publicized insider-trading jury trial.2 Soon 
afterwards, over the course of four months, the SEC lost at trial again 
and again.3 Around the same time, the SEC’s then-new Enforcement 
                                                     
1. See Justin Baer, Chad Bray & Jean Eaglesham, ‘Fab’ Trader Liable in Fraud, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323681904578641843284450004 
[https://perma.cc/A98Q-X6XU] (reporting that the victory produced “happiness around the halls” of 
the SEC). 
2. See Andrew Harris & Tom Korosec, SEC Loses as Mark Cuban Triumphs in Insider-Trading 
Trial, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2013, 1:48 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-
16/billionaire-mark-cuban-found-not-liable-in-sec-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/ED22-R62J]. 
3. Between December 2, 2013 and January 27, 2014, the SEC lost against eight defendants 
charged with insider trading and accounting fraud. See SEC v. Steffes et al., No. 1:10-cv-6266 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2014); SEC v. Schvacho, No. 1:12-cv-2557 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2014); SEC v. 
Jensen & Tekulve, No. 2:11-cv-5316 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013); SEC v. Kovzan, No. 2:11-cv-2017 
(D. Kan. Dec. 2, 2013). Between October 2013 and the end of January 2014, the SEC lost at trial 
against nine of fourteen defendants. One of these cases was appealed and remanded, so, at the end, 
the SEC’s track record for the period may be less grim than initially reported. By contrast, at trials 
concluded between February 2014 and the end of February 2016, the SEC lost against only three of 
thirty-five defendants. Data on file with author. 
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Director announced that the agency would file more enforcement actions 
in the administrative forum instead of in federal district court.4 Coming 
on the heels of trial losses, the change in policy looked like an 
opportunistic search for a more favorable adjudicator. Contemporaneous 
news articles and commentary insinuated that the SEC was motivated by 
“home-court advantage,”5 and speculated that administrative law judges 
(“ALJs”), who decide cases filed in the administrative forum, were 
biased in favor of the agency.6 
The change in enforcement policy was possible because of a 
provision included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010.7 Section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act 
authorized the SEC to seek fines from any firm or individual in an 
administrative proceeding.8 Before the amendment, the SEC could 
impose fines in administrative proceedings only on registered firms and 
individuals, such as broker-dealers, investment advisers, and firms that 
registered securities with the agency.9 But the SEC had to sue in federal 
district court to secure fines against non-registered firms and 
individuals—public companies and executive officers charged with 
accounting fraud; traders charged with insider trading violations; and 
those charged with selling unregistered securities, including most Ponzi 
schemers.10 
Initially, expanding the jurisdiction of ALJs, who decide cases filed in 
the administrative forum, did not raise eyebrows.11 Few recognized the 
amendment’s full potential and the SEC was reluctant to use it.12 As the 
SEC started filing more actions in the administrative forum, defendants’ 
                                                     
4. Gretchen Morgenson, At the SEC, a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-home-court-
edge.html [https://perma.cc/X8MC-GY63]. 
5. Id. 
6. In the alternative, more restrained commentators suggested that even if ALJs were not biased, 
procedural rules in administrative proceedings disadvantaged respondents. See William McLucas & 
Matthew Martens, How to Rein in the SEC, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/how-to-rein-in-the-sec-1433285747 [https://perma.cc/73CH-GA28]. 
7. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
8. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1862. 
9. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
429. 
10. See discussion infra section I.A. 
11. See discussion infra section I.A. 
12. See discussion infra section II.B. 
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objections and public unease began to mount.13 They culminated in a 
front-page report published in the Wall Street Journal.14 The news story, 
based on an analysis of outcomes in SEC enforcement actions over 
several years, reported that securities defendants were considerably more 
likely to lose when the SEC sued them in the administrative forum than 
when it sued them in court.15 The story purported to offer empirical 
validation for the claims that ALJs were biased in favor of the SEC, and 
accused the SEC of steering weaker cases to the administrative forum.16 
The news story attracted almost immediate responses by federal 
judges,17 practitioners,18 advocates,19 academics,20 and the press.21 
Defendants have cited the reported figures in lawsuits that sought to 
enjoin SEC enforcement actions filed in the administrative forum, 
arguing that the administrative forum gave the Enforcement Division 
“an unfair advantage.”22 One federal judge said that these arguments 
were “compelling and meritorious,”23 and another added, quoting the 
                                                     
13. See Urska Velikonja, Securities Settlements in the Shadows, 126 YALE L.J. F. 124 (2016); 
Morgenson, supra note 4 (quoting SEC enforcement director Andrew Ceresney as saying that the 
SEC “will be bringing more administrative proceedings given the recent statutory changes”). 
14. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590 
[https://perma.cc/6WGY-2XS2] (reporting that in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 the SEC prevailed in 
90% and 100% of trials before ALJs, respectively, and in 75% and 63% of trials in court, 
respectively). 
15. Id. 
16. See id. 
17. See, e.g., Jed. S. Rakoff, Address at the PLI Securities Regulation Institute: Is the S.E.C. 
Becoming a Law Unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/ 
rakoff-pli-speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/277Q-YF53] [hereinafter Rakoff Address]. 
18. See, e.g., McLucas & Martens, supra note 6. 
19. See, e.g., Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice—17 CFR Part 201 (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/021882_SEC_Reform_FIN1. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/W6AR-QDJS]. 
20. Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1160–61 
(2016); Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2016); 
Gideon Mark, SEC Enforcement Discretion, 94 TEX. L. REV. 261 (2016); see also David Zaring, 
Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1158 (2016). 
21. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Rules SEC In-House Judge’s Appointment ‘Likely 
Unconstitutional,’ WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2015, 4:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-
rules-sec-in-house-judges-appointment-likely-unconstitutional-1433796161 [https://perma.cc/TG6Q 
-LBAC]; Jenna Greene, The SEC’s on a Long Winning Streak, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202715464297/The-SECs-On-a-Long-Winning-Streak 
[https://perma.cc/TG6Q-LBAC]. 
22. Douglas Davison, Matthew Martens, Nicole Rabner, Natalie Rastin & John Valentine, 
Litigating with—and at—the SEC, 48 THE REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 103, 103 (2015). 
23. Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-cv-3, 2015 WL 905349, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2015). 
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Wall Street Journal figures, that litigation before ALJs was “unfair to the 
litigants.”24 The SEC’s inspector general has conducted an investigation 
into whether ALJs are biased.25 Even academic commentators, who are 
usually skeptical of news reporting, have taken the news articles at face 
value and relied on them to support their analysis.26 Relying on the Wall 
Street Journal reporting, two bills have been introduced in Congress to 
reduce the perceived procedural and substantive bias in administrative 
securities enforcement.27 The SEC, under significant and sustained 
pressure to change its enforcement practices, recently amended 
procedural rules that govern litigation before ALJs.28 Although the 
amendments to the SEC’s Rules of Practice substantially expand 
defendants’ procedural rights in administrative proceedings, the critics 
of its enforcement program demand more by continuing to invoke the 
purported disparity in outcomes.29 
That empirical support would influence the debate about a 
controversial statute is laudable—assuming that the data are 
                                                     
24. Rakoff Address, supra note 17, at 11. 
25. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, INTERIM REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CASE # 15-ALJ- 
0482-I 4 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/ oig-sec-interim-report-investigation-admin-
law-judges.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG9L-HX2Q] (finding no evidence of bias). 
26. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 20, at 1160−61; Mark, supra note 20, at 261–62. 
27. In the press release announcing the bill, the proponent of the first bill relied heavily and 
explicitly on the Wall Street Journal reporting to justify the amendments. Peter J. Henning, SEC 
Victories Delay Challenge on In-House Judges, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/business/dealbook/sec-victories-delay-challenge-on-in-house-
judges.html [https://perma.cc/29Z9-MV43]; Press Release, U.S. Congressman Scott Garrett, Garrett 
Introduces Bill to Restore Due Process Rights for All Americans (Oct. 22, 2015), 
https://garrett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/garrett-introduces-bill-to-restore-due-process-
rights-for-all-americans [https://perma.cc/V85E-5442] [hereinafter Garrett Press Release]. 
28. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,212 (July 29, 2016) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201) https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UM2B-TNCU]. Half of the comment letters on the proposed amendments to the 
SEC’s Rules of Practice cited the Wall Street Journal news story to contend that securities 
defendants sued in administrative proceeding “lose substantially more frequently than do defendants 
in federal court.” See, e.g., Susan E. Brune, Brune & Richard LLP, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rule on Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Nov. 23, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3AS-8FGK]. 
29. See Bradley J. Bondi, Sara E. Ortiz & Michael Wheatley, Cahill Discusses SEC’s 
Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY 
BLOG (July 21, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/07/21/cahill-discusses-secs-
amendments-to-rules-of-practice-for-administrative-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/GG3J-3NZM] 
(“It remains to be seen whether these amendments will impact the statistical disparity . . . .”); 
Kimberley A. Strassel, The SEC Plays Judge and Jury, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-sec-plays-judge-and-jury-1470353410 [https://perma.cc/5PVD-
RG34] (opining that the SEC “loves” to litigate before ALJs because it is more likely to win, citing 
to the Wall Street Journal report). 
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representative and the analysis thorough and correct. Unfortunately, the 
evidence that most critics of ALJ adjudication cite is misleading in 
important respects. This Article is the first to collect and analyze all 
enforcement actions filed over a relatively long period of time: it 
reviews enforcement actions filed between fiscal years 2007 and 2015 
against 10,967 defendants.30 Using the collected data, the Article tests 
two related claims that the Wall Street Journal and the critics of 
administrative adjudication have advanced: first, whether the SEC is 
steering more contested cases to administrative proceedings, and second, 
whether the SEC is more likely to prevail in cases decided by ALJs. 
As to the first claim, the Article reports evidence that the SEC has 
been litigating more in administrative proceedings since the adoption the 
Dodd-Frank Act.31 Not all of the increase is attributable to expanded 
jurisdiction of ALJs; about half of the increase is due to the fact that the 
SEC has recently brought more actions that could have been filed in 
administrative proceedings even before the Dodd-Frank amendment. As 
to the second claim, the difference in outcomes is largely the result of 
the different nature of cases filed in each type of forum. The SEC is 
considerably less likely to prevail against a defendant sued for insider 
trading and accounting fraud regardless of forum. These cases are also 
considerably less likely to be filed in the administrative forum. As a 
result, a comparison of success rates by venue that does not control for 
the subject matter of the action will understate the SEC’s success in 
court and overstate its success in the administrative forum. In addition, 
the news stories to date compared outcomes after trial.32 But most SEC 
cases decided by a judge are resolved by summary judgment.33 After one 
controls for the subject matter, or once one includes cases decided by 
dispositive motions and not only after trial, the reported disparity in 
outcomes disappears.34 In fact, the only way to reproduce the Wall Street 
Journal win-ratios is to compare outcomes after trial and on motion to 
                                                     
30. The only other serious academic effort to evaluate case outcomes has been made by Professor 
Grundfest, though with a considerably more limited set of data. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or 
Foul? SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform Through Removal Legislation, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2016). 
31. See discussion infra section II.B. 
32. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 4 (noting that the SEC prevailed in “7.5 out of 12” cases 
litigated in district court). The SEC prevailed against 59 defendants sued in 2011 (data on file with 
author), suggesting that the figure reported by the New York Times does not include summary 
judgments. See also Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1178 (implying that the Wall Street Journal reports 
did not include summary judgments in their analysis). 
33. See infra Table 3. 
34. See discussion infra section II.C. 
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dismiss, but exclude cases resoloved by summary judgment. In short, the 
Wall Street Journal compared apples to oranges. 
The results reported in this Article are significant because of the 
substantial influence that the Wall Street Journal’s reporting has had and 
may continue to have on the law and practice of securities enforcement. 
At the same time, the results reported in this Article should not be 
understood to imply that the type of forum does not matter in securities 
enforcement. Rather, the information that is available on enforcement 
actions does not allow one to draw useful empirical conclusions 
regarding the relationship between forum choice and case outcome. The 
controversy surrounding administrative adjudication will no doubt 
continue after this Article, but hopefully not on the basis of discredited 
empirical evidence. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the legal 
background of the Dodd-Frank amendment, the difference in procedural 
rules in court and before ALJs, and the related constitutional and 
empirical challenges. Part II uses a complete dataset of enforcement 
actions filed between 2007 and 2015 to assess two claims: first, that the 
reported increase in the cases filed in administrative proceedings is due 
largely to contested litigation before ALJs; and second, that ALJs are 
more likely to rule for the SEC than federal judges. The Article finds 
only limited support for the first claim and none for the second. Part III 
discusses the implications of the results. Significantly, because of 
omitted and unobservable variables, as well as selection bias, the result 
should not be interpreted to suggest that the forum makes no difference. 
Rather, the data in this space is not useful to resolve what is at its core a 
public relations problem for the SEC. It is nevertheless important to 
correct the record because the Wall Street Journal’s study has been so 
influential since its publication. The Article concludes with a caveat 
regarding greater use of empirical scholarship in policymaking. As the 
influence of big data increases, so should our concern about the quality 
of the data and the analysis. The significant impact of the Wall Street 
Journal’s flawed reporting provides a cautionary tale. 
I. LEGAL CHANGE AND THE RELATED CONTROVERSY 
This Part sets the stage for the empirical analysis that follows in Part 
II. It explains the legal background and the significance of the Dodd-
Frank amendment, outlines the procedural differences between the two 
different types of forums, and concludes with a discussion of the 
constitutional and empirical challenges raised against adjudication by 
ALJs. 
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A. The Legal Change 
The Dodd-Frank Act included hundreds of new legal provisions. 
Some of them, like the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau and the Volcker Rule, attracted considerable political, media, 
and academic attention at the time they were adopted.35 Others did not. 
Section 929P(a) was one of those sections that few (outside of a small 
group of securities lawyers) paid attention to at the time. The legislative 
history for the amendment is remarkably sparse. Robert Khuzami, the 
SEC’s then-Director of Enforcement submitted a ten-page statement to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of Dodd-Frank, and he 
devoted a single sentence to what would become section 929P(a): 
“[a]dditional legislative proposals that would serve to enhance the 
Division’s effectiveness and efficiency include the ability to seek civil 
penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings.”36 The only legislative history 
of section 929P(a) in the House Report on Dodd-Frank states that “[t]his 
section streamlines the SEC’s existing enforcement authorities by 
permitting the SEC to seek civil money penalties in cease-and-desist 
proceedings under Federal securities laws.”37 
Historically, the SEC could seek to enjoin or to stop violations of 
securities laws but could not seek monetary sanctions. During the 1970s, 
the SEC began to seek disgorgement of ill-gotten gain as an ancillary 
equitable remedy,38 but it did not have the right to seek fines until 
1984.39 The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform 
Act of 1990 (“Reform Act”) expanded the SEC’s penalty authority.40 
The Reform Act empowered the SEC to seek fines in administrative 
proceedings against entities and individuals registered with the SEC, 
including broker-dealers, investment advisers, and firms that registered 
                                                     
35. See, e.g., Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html [https://perma.cc/Z2YK-
WZP2]. 
36. Mortgage Fraud, Securities Fraud, and the Financial Meltdown: Prosecuting Those 
Responsible: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.  (2009) (statement of 
Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts120909 
rk.htm [https://perma.cc/YG4K-4SYL]. 
37. H.R. REP. No. 111-687, § 211, at 78 (2009), https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/hrpt687/ 
CRPT-111hrpt687-pt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ5E-CWV5]. 
38. See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1111–12 (2008). 
39. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 empowered the SEC to seek civil fines in insider 
trading cases. See Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(l)(A)). 
40. Pub. L. No. 101-429 (1990). 
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securities with the agency.41 But in order to secure fines against non-
registered firms and individuals, the SEC had to sue them in court. For 
example, the SEC sued WorldCom in court for accounting fraud and 
obtained a $750-million fine;42 likewise the SEC sued Angelo Mozilo in 
court for securities fraud and secured the “largest-ever financial penalty 
against a public company’s senior executive.”43 
Section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the SEC to seek 
civil penalties in an administrative cease-and-desist proceeding against 
any person who is found to have violated federal securities laws.44 The 
new provision allows the SEC to resolve almost any enforcement action 
in an administrative proceeding, but it does not eliminate the SEC’s 
authority to litigate in court.45 As a result, the SEC can exercise 
discretion in choosing where to file any enforcement action,46 except for 
actions in which the SEC seeks remedies that only courts or ALJs can 
impose.47 When an agency can choose the forum, it will usually litigate 
where it is more cost-effective to do so.48 
Considerable procedural differences between adjudication in court 
and in an administrative proceeding are discussed in more detail below. 
Respondents—as defendants in administrative proceedings are called—
face a time-compressed schedule as compared with litigation in court, 
                                                     
41. Id. 
42. Press Release, SEC, The Honorable Jed Rakoff Approves Settlement of SEC’s Claim for a 
Civil Penalty Against WorldCom (July 7, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/ press/2003-81.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6XMG-PGWT]. 
43. Press Release, SEC, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC’s Largest-Ever 
Financial Penalty Against a Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm [https://perma.cc/F5Z6-WK3H]. 
44. 124 Stat. 1862 (2010). A cease-and-desist proceeding is an administrative proceeding seeking 
to order the respondent to cease and desist violating securities laws. The court equivalent is an 
injunctive proceeding in which the SEC seeks an obey-the-law injunction. 
45. See Dodd-Frank § 929P(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1862. The section expands the jurisdiction of ALJs 
without amending other provisions relating to venue. 
46. Andrew Ceresney, the former director of the SEC Enforcement Division explained that 
“Congress provided us authority to obtain penalties in administrative proceedings against 
unregistered parties comparable to those we already could obtain from registered persons.” Andrew 
Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law 
Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/ 
Speech/1370543515297 [https://perma.cc/V4P6-77ZB] [hereinafter Ceresney, ABA Remarks]. 
47. For example, only a court can order a clawback under section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
while an associational or professional bar can be ordered only in administrative proceedings. 
48. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, Keynote Speech at New York City Bar 4th 
Annual White Collar Institute (May 12, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-nyc-bar-
4th-white-collar-key-note.html [https://perma.cc/97ZV-LYJH]. The SEC is far from the only 
agency that can seek monetary penalties in an administrative proceeding: so can the FTC, the 
OSHA, banking regulators, etc. 
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and they have fewer procedural protections.49 Different rules have given 
rise to constitutional objections and, more recently, to empirical claims 
that respondents are at a disadvantage when forced to defend themselves 
in administrative proceedings.50 The following sections discuss these 
developments in turn. 
B. Procedural Differences 
The SEC has plenary enforcement authority over violations of federal 
securities laws.51 In court, the Commission is authorized to seek 
monetary penalties, disgorgement, clawbacks, injunctions, officer and 
director bars, and an assortment of equitable remedies.52 In an 
administrative forum, the agency can seek monetary penalties and 
disgorgement, cease-and-desist orders (which are similar to injunctions), 
as well as officer and director bars, various bars from working in the 
securities industry, and bars from appearing before the Commission as 
auditor or attorney.53 The overlap in remedies is not perfect, but in most 
enforcement actions the Commission can “obtain many . . . of the same 
remedies in administrative proceedings as [it] could get in district 
court.”54 
An administrative proceeding differs from in-court litigation in 
several respects. In settled actions filed in the administrative forum, 
ALJs are not involved at all: the Enforcement Division proposes a 
settlement and the Commission (i.e., the sitting commissioners) 
approves the settlement by issuing the order instituting proceedings 
(“OIP”), making findings, and imposing sanctions.55 By contrast, settled 
actions filed in federal district court must be approved first by the 
Commission and then by a judge in order to become effective.56 
Procedural rules differ more significantly in contested actions as 
compared with settled actions, though the difference can easily be 
                                                     
49. See discussion infra in section I.B. 
50. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 4; Eaglesham, supra note 14. 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a), (b) (2012) (“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission [that] any rule 
or regulation . . . have been or are about to be violated, it . . . may investigate such facts.” (emphasis 
added)). 
52. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–78u-1 (2012). 
53. Id. §§ 78u-2–78u-3. 
54. Ceresney, ABA Remarks, supra note 46. 
55. See, e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78291, 2016 WL 4363820 
(July 12, 2016) (order instituting public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings, making 
findings, and imposing remedial sanctions and a cease-and-desist order). 
56. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 128. 
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overstated.57 Formal administrative adjudication at the SEC is governed 
by the Administrative Procedure Act and the SEC’s Rules of Practice.58 
Internal rules provide that ALJs conduct hearings “in a manner similar to 
non-jury trials in the federal district courts.”59 ALJs receive career 
appointments, not unlike federal judges.60 At a high level of generality, 
proceedings before ALJs are similar to judicial adjudication.61 The 
parties have the opportunity to submit briefs and to propose findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.62 After a hearing, the ALJ prepares a 
written decision that can be appealed to the Commission.63 
But the devil is in the details. A defendant in federal district court has 
the right to full civil discovery and adjudication by an independent 
Article III judge, and the procedure is governed by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64 A defendant sued 
in court is usually entitled to a jury trial, though more often than not, the 
SEC’s civil actions are resolved by summary judgment, not by a jury.65 
Judges who preside over cases heard in court are completely 
independent from the agency. Significantly, judges are also better 
positioned to dispatch “wholesale rebukes of agencies” and are less 
constrained by “bureaucratic regularity” than ALJs.66 
                                                     
57. SEC ALJs enjoy many of the powers that trial judges have. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57. But see 
Sarah N. Lynch, SEC to File Some Insider-Trading Cases in Its In-House Court, REUTERS (June 11, 
2014) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-insidertrading-idUSKBN0EM2DI20140611 [https:// 
perma.cc/Y64E-BU6Y] (quoting one defendant’s charge that the administrative proceedings at the 
SEC are a “kangaroo court”). 
58. 17 C.F.R. § 201 (2012). 
59. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
(2016), https://www.sec.gov/alj [https://perma.cc/4D82-K2DW]. 
60. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a) (2012). Grounds for removal of ALJs who are civil servants are 
broader than for federal judges, who can only be removed by impeachment. 
61. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 744 (2002) (“[T]he role 
of the ALJ is similar to that of an Article III judge . . . .”); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 
(1978) (“[T]he role of the modern . . . administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to 
that of a judge.”). 
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.340 (2012). 
63. Id. § 201.360. Of cases analyzed in this Article, 56 were appealed to the Commission. The 
Commission affirmed the Initial Decision without changes in 29 cases (52%); it reduced sanctions 
in 17 cases (30%), including dismissing charges in 3 cases; and it increased sanctions in 10 cases 
(18%), including finding liability and imposing sanctions in 4 cases that ALJs had dismissed. 
64. FED. R. EVID. 1101; FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
65. See discussion infra section II.B. 
66. Zaring, supra note 20, at 1217 (using United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), 
as an example for a broad equitable decision). 
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By contrast, ALJs are SEC employees. There is no jury. ALJs follow 
the rules of administrative procedure and have no equitable authority.67 
ALJs can hear “[a]ny oral or documentary evidence”68 except for 
evidence that is “irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.”69 
Hearsay evidence is more easily admissible in proceedings before ALJs 
than in court.70 Defendants can submit only a limited number of 
depositions in litigation before an ALJ; they can submit more 
depositions in court.71 Some motions, including motions to dismiss, 
either were unavailable in administrative proceedings until recently72 or 
were available in more limited circumstances than they are in court.73 
Most significantly, the process before ALJs is much quicker than in 
court. Mandatory timelines imposed by the SEC’s Rules of Practice 
require that in many cases, the entire administrative proceeding be 
completed in less than one year.74 The July 2016 amendments extended 
the prehearing period from four to up to ten months. Despite the 
extension, the entire timeline before ALJs remains compressed when 
compared with court, where the median contested enforcement action 
takes an extra five months to resolve.75 The tight timeline in a 
proceeding before an ALJ can be both a bug and a feature for the 
                                                     
67. Administrative adjudication is a creature of statute, whereas courts have equitable authority 
arising from the common law. See generally Zaring, supra note 20, at 1216 (observing that when 
reviewing agency actions, courts “apply . . . the procedural requirements of the APA” and not 
“broad equitable principles”). 
68. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012). 
69. 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (2012). 
70. Thomas C. Gonnella, Exchange Act Release No. 1579 (July 2, 2014) (order on motions  
in limine), https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljorders/2014/ap-1579.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC4W-ST47] 
(providing that “when ‘in doubt,’” about the admissibility of evidence, “the evidence should be 
admitted”). 
71. See Zaring, supra note 20, at 1167 n.54 (quoting SEC Director of Enforcement Ceresney as 
saying that depositions in criminal proceedings are allowed only in “exceptional circumstances”). 
72. The amendment to the Rules of Practice adopted in July 2016 authorized either party in an 
administrative proceeding to file a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary disposition, and a 
motion for a ruling as a matter of law. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 
Fed. Reg. 50,212 (July 29, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
73. See Alexander I. Platt, Unstacking the Deck: Administrative Summary Judgment and Political 
Control (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2809199 [https://perma.cc/24MG-LDG5] 
[hereinafter Platt, Unstacking the Deck]. 
74. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (2012). 
75. The median ALJ decision is handed down 632 days after filing; the median court decision is 
rendered in 767 days. The difference is somewhat larger at the 75th percentile: 972 days for Initial 
Decision compared with 1170 days for a court decision. Data on file with author. See also Press 
Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings (July 
13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-142.html [https://perma.cc/6J7F-GYZ8]. 
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respondent. On the one hand, it may be difficult for a respondent to 
review the evidence and prepare a defense within the short timeline.76 
On the other hand, once the enforcement action is filed in an 
administrative proceeding, the SEC Enforcement Division’s trial lawyers 
face the same tight deadlines.77 A longer timeline in court gives the 
defendant more time to prepare a defense, but it also extends the period 
during which the defendant may not be able to work in the securities 
industry because of the ongoing proceedings.78 
There are considerable and important procedural differences between 
an SEC administrative proceeding and litigation in federal district court, 
but as informed commentators have observed, “those differences do not 
always favor the Enforcement Division.”79 It is certainly not obvious 
that the two sets of procedural rules must or should be identical.80 
Respondents in administrative proceedings do enjoy a significant 
advantage over those sued in federal court. The SEC’s Rules of Practice 
impose a Brady81 obligation on the Enforcement Division.82 The 
Division must turn over all exculpatory evidence to the respondent 
before any hearing in administrative proceeding, but there is no 
comparable obligation to defendants the SEC sues in court.83 
                                                     
76. See Davison et al., supra note 22, at 107. 
77. See id. at 108. This is true once the action is filed but perhaps misleading. The Enforcement 
Division that conducted the investigation is familiar with all the material it collected, while the 
defendant’s lawyer may be familiar with only part of the record from the investigation. See, e.g., 
Harding Advisory LLC & Wing F. Chau, Securities Act Release No. 10277, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 32415, 2017 WL 66592 (Jan. 6, 2017). 
78. Cf. Judy K. Wolf, Initial Decision Release No. 851, 2015 WL 4639230 (Aug. 5, 2015) (noting 
that once Wells Fargo became aware of the SEC investigation, the respondent was placed on 
administrative leave, and Wells Fargo subsequently terminated her). 
79. Davison et al., supra note 22, at 113. 
80. The United States Supreme Court noted in the past that the similarities between adjudication 
in court and before ALJs were “overwhelming.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 
U.S. 743, 759 (2002). 
81. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
82. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(a)(1) (2015) (“[T]he Division of Enforcement shall make available 
for inspection and copying by any party documents obtained by the Division prior to the institution 
of proceedings, in connection with the investigation leading to the Division’s recommendation to 
institute proceedings.”). 
83. Under the rules of civil discovery, the SEC may be compelled to hand over evidence to the 
defendant, but only if the defendant requests specific evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
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C. Constitutional Challenges 
The SEC was initially reluctant to use section 929P(a).84 One of the 
first contested enforcement actions filed under the new jurisdictional 
provision was against Rajat Gupta, a high-profile insider trading 
respondent.85 Gupta was one of at least twenty-eight defendants in a 
sprawling insider-trading investigation into Raj Rajaratnam’s hedge fund 
Galleon Management LP. The SEC sued twenty-seven defendants in 
court, and one, Gupta, in the administrative forum.86 Gupta filed a 
lawsuit against the SEC in federal court seeking to enjoin the pending 
proceeding before the ALJ.87 Among other claims, he contended that the 
proceeding before the ALJ would deprive him of equal protection 
because similar defendants were sued in court, not before an ALJ.88 
After an exchange of briefs and a denial of the SEC’s motion to 
dismiss,89 the Enforcement Division moved to dismiss the administrative 
enforcement action90 and sued Gupta in court, like other defendants it 
prosecuted for insider trading.91 
The SEC has faced additional constitutional challenges in lawsuits 
seeking to enjoin enforcement actions filed in the administrative 
forum.92 Several district courts have ruled that using ALJs to resolve 
                                                     
84. See Morgenson, supra note 4. 
85. Rajat K. Gupta, Securities Act Release No. 9192, Exchange Act Release No. 63995, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 29590 (Mar. 1, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/33-9192.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5RH-945F] (order 
instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings). 
86. Complaint at 1–2, Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 2011 WL 923951. 
87. Id. at 1. 
88. See id. at 6–8. 
89. Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 503. 
90. Rajat K. Gupta, Securities Act Release No. 9249, Exchange Act Release No. 65037, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 29745, 2011 WL 3407833 (Aug. 4, 2011) (order dismissing 
proceedings). 
91. Complaint, SEC v. Gupta, No. 1:11-cv-7566, 2013 WL 3784138 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013), 
2011 WL 5105859. Gupta may have thought that his chances for an acquittal were better in court, so 
he rolled the dice and lost. Less than a year after the SEC dismissed the administrative proceeding 
and filed a lawsuit in court, a jury found Mr. Gupta guilty of insider trading in a parallel criminal 
action, and in mid-2013, the SEC, too, prevailed against Mr. Gupta in a sweeping summary 
judgment decision. SEC v. Gupta, No. 1:11-cv-7566, 2013 WL 3784138, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 
2013) (holding in favor of the SEC on all counts on liability and remedies). 
92. For an analysis of the constitutional arguments advanced by defendants in SEC enforcement 
actions, see Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 14 (2015). 
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contested actions was either unconstitutional93 or “likely 
unconstitutional.”94 
The most successful and most commonly advanced claims have been 
those based on the separation of powers as defined in Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution, specifically appointment and removal authority.95 
ALJs are not appointed within the meaning of Article II by the 
Commission as Article II requires for appointments of “inferior 
officers.”96 Instead, the Commission hires ALJs through a competitive 
process managed by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
(“OPM”).97 When the Commission seeks to hire a new ALJ, the Chief 
ALJ obtains a list of eligible candidates from OPM. The OPM sets the 
evaluation criteria and the SEC’s Office of Human Resources makes the 
ultimate selection based on those criteria.98 
In addition, ALJs enjoy multiple layers of protection from removal by 
the President.99 If ALJs are indeed inferior officers, then a violation of 
Article II follows almost automatically, unless the United States 
Supreme Court were to craft an exception.100 Even if the Supreme Court 
were to find ALJ appointment unconstitutional under the Appointments 
Clause, the fix—appointment by the Commission101—would not change 
the procedural rules before ALJs nor the perception of their (un)fairness. 
Marginally less successful have been claims that administrative 
adjudication deprives respondents of the right to trial by jury guaranteed 
by the Seventh Amendment.102 The right to a jury trial only applies to 
“suits at common law.”103 The Supreme Court has held that “when 
Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their 
                                                     
93. See Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-01801-LLM, 2015 WL 12030508 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); 
Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (holding that litigation before an ALJ deprived the defendant of equal 
protection). 
94. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Faces Block on In-House Judge, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2015, at C1. 
95. See Platt, supra note 92, at 14 (listing eight defendants who raised removal claims). 
96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 511–12 (2010). 
97. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(f) (2016). 
98. 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(e)(2) (2016). 
99. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (2010) (holding that “multilevel protection from 
removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President”). 
100. See Platt, supra note 92, at 15 (observing that given the widespread use of ALJs across the 
federal bureaucracy, a holding of their unconstitutionality would be “potentially transformative”); 
Zaring, supra note 20, at 1195 (explaining that given the importance of impartial administrative 
adjudication, the Supreme Court would likely find an exception). 
101. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
102. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
103. Id. 
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adjudication to an administrative agency . . . without violating the 
Seventh Amendment.”104 In addition, penalty regimes similar to the 
SEC’s are widely used across the administrative state, suggesting that 
challengers will either have to explain why SEC ALJ adjudications in 
particular are bad or risk undermining much of administrative 
practice.105 
Finally, defendants have raised objections related to due process and 
non-delegation, none of which have succeeded, nor are they likely to.106 
Although the process before ALJs is different than the process in the 
courts, both have passed constitutional muster in like situations.107 
Lawsuits seeking to enjoin the SEC’s administrative proceedings for 
constitutional infirmities have had mixed success. The D.C. Circuit held 
that ALJ appointment and removal were consistent with Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution,108 while the Tenth Circuit held that they were not.109 
On February 16, 2017, the D.C. Circuit vacated its earlier judgment and 
granted the securities defendant’s petition for rehearing en banc.110 By 
contrast, the empirical challenge to ALJs has persisted without much 
questioning. 
D. Empirical Challenges 
In addition to arguing that ALJ adjudication is unconstitutional, 
defendants and their counsel have effectively argued that administrative 
proceedings are unfair.111 To buttress their claims, they have invariably 
                                                     
104. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977). 
105. Platt, supra note 92, at 18. 
106. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 759 (2002) (holding 
that the similarities between adjudication before ALJs and before federal district court judges are 
“overwhelming”); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55–56 (1975) (holding that it did not violate due 
process for the SEC to both investigate and adjudicate a case); see also Zaring, supra note 20, at 
1197. 
107. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 743; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55–56; Zaring, supra note 
20, at 1197. 
108.  See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
109. See David F. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016). 
110. Order Granting Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 
832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 1661665). 
111. See Bondi, Ortiz & Wheatley, supra note 29; Olson, infra note 122 (concluding that the 
amendments to the Rules of Practice “fail to provide adequate protection”); Brune, supra note 28, at 
5 (arguing that more significant procedural changes were necessary because “the Commission is 
able to stack the deck in its favor by having its cases adjudicated by its own judges”). 
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relied on the Wall Street Journal report showing a disparity in success 
rates.112 
Two strands of empirical critiques of the SEC’s administrative 
adjudication have been advanced. The first contends that procedural 
rules in administrative proceedings are so unfair to the respondents that 
they simply cannot win against the SEC.113 The second contends that 
ALJs are biased against respondents because ALJs are SEC 
employees.114 Both strands rely on the same empirical data.115 
Perceptions that administrative proceedings may be biased for either 
procedural or subjective reasons have been circulating for some time. In 
October 2013, the New York Times published an op-ed that suggested 
                                                     
112. See Amended Complaint, Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-01801-LLM, 2015 WL 12030508 (N.D. 
Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (citing the Wall Street Journal article for the proposition that the SEC won in 
90% of ALJ proceedings between January 2010 and March 2015); Complaint, Timbervest v. SEC, 
No. 1:15-cv-02106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Complaint, Tilton v. SEC, 
No. 1:15-cv-2472, 2015 WL 4006165 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Criticizes SEC’s In-House Court, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2015, at C3. 
113. See Eaglesham, supra note 14; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MARKET 
COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES, at 15; Joseph Quincy Patterson, 
Many Key Issues Still Left Unaddressed in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Attempt to 
Modernize Its Rules of Practice, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1699 (2016); Ryan Jones, The 
Fight Over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 
SMU L. REV. 507, 510 (2015); Andrew N. Vollmer, Four Ways to Improve SEC Enforcement, 43 
SEC. REG. L.J. 333, 336 (2015); William F. Johnson & Amelia R. Medina, SEC’s Administrative 
Enforcement Intensifies Fairness Debate, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal. 
com/id=1202675574765/SECs-Administrative-Enforcement-Intensifies-Fairness-Debate?slreturn= 
20160705054020 [https://perma.cc/BU2P-T96U]. 
114. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 [https://perma.cc/E25Z-
EBS5]; Morgenson, supra note 4; Erin Fuchs, SEC “Victim” Mark Cuban Speaks out to Help Guy 
Who’s Being Sued in Georgia, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 16, 2015, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/mark-cuban-speaks-out-against-the-secs-in-house-judges-2015-9 
[https://perma.cc/4TXF-9GHW]. This is contrary to what experienced securities practitioners 
believe. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ex-Enforcement Chief Calls for Reforms to In-House 
Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-ex-enforcement-chief-calls-
for-reformsto-in-house-judges-1431471223 [https://perma.cc/7NCE-BBP9] (“Robert Mahony, who 
retired as an SEC judge in 2012 after more than 14 years at the agency, told the New York 
conference the SEC judges were ‘absolutely 100% fair [and] straight.’” (alteration in original)); 
McLucas & Martens, supra note 6, at A17 (opining that “there is no evidence that ALJs harbor 
bias”); Daniel R. Walfish, The Real Problem with SEC Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix 
It, FORBES (July 20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/07/20/the-real-problem-
with-sec-administrative-proceedings-and-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/AFZ8-NRZR] (“My own 
observations are that the ALJs strive to be fair to all parties . . . .”). 
115. A third strand, namely that the Commission hears appeals from ALJ initial decisions, has 
been advanced but is less commonly invoked. Significantly, the Commission rarely rejects an ALJ’s 
decision wholesale—though the same is true for appellate review of district court decisions. For 
data on outcomes in appeals to the Commission, see supra note 63. 
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disparate success rates between actions decided by ALJs as compared 
with court.116 But the data was limited to one year of enforcement 
actions. 
In October 2014, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page 
report on SEC enforcement.117 The story purported to show that the SEC 
was substantially more likely to prevail against respondents it sued in 
administrative proceedings than against respondents it sued in federal 
district court.118 The Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC “won all 
six contested administrative hearings [in fiscal year 2014] but only 
61%—11 out of 18—[of] federal-court trials.”119 In a subsequent story, 
the Wall Street Journal reported that over a five year period, the SEC 
prevailed in 90% of cases litigated before ALJs, compared with 69% of 
cases tried in federal court.120 Significantly, both stories suggested that 
the SEC was sending more cases to in-house judges opportunistically, 
because ALJs were more likely to rule in favor of the SEC.121 
Unlike previous news stories that relied on limited data, the Wall 
Street Journal’s reporting purported to show a persistent disparity in 
outcomes over several years. The report has had an unusually 
widespread impact. Following the Wall Street Journal reporting, many 
respected commentators observed that the lack of procedural protections 
before ALJs “significantly disadvantages respondents who are charged 
in the SEC’s in-house courts.”122 One prominent judge concluded that 
SEC administrative proceedings were “arguabl[y] unfair[],” and 
suggested that difficult securities cases be decided “by neutral federal 
                                                     
116. Morgenson, supra note 4 (reporting that the SEC prevailed in 88% of cases filed before 
ALJs and in 63% of cases filed in court during fiscal year 2011). 
117. Eaglesham, supra note 14. 
118. See id. 
119. Id. 
120. Eaglesham, supra note 114. 
121. Id. (reporting that in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 the SEC prevailed in 90% and 100% of 
trials before ALJs and in 75% and 63% of trials in court). 
122. Theodore B. Olson, Gibson Dunn, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Amendments to 
the Commission’s Rules of Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-18-15/s71815-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR8L-A6DF]. See also McLucas & Martens, 
supra note 6, at A17; Jean Eaglesham, SEC Gives Ground on Judges; Facing Criticism and 
Challenges, Agency Increases Defendants’ Legal Safeguards, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gives-ground-on-judges-1443139425 [https://perma.cc/7BYU-
8DT6] (quoting Joel Cohen, a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, who successfully defended 
Nelson Obus in 2014 against the SEC as saying that he would not “have been able to develop the 
facts that convinced the jury to find in [their] favor” before an ALJ). 
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courts.”123 Citing the same figures reported by the Wall Street Journal, 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a report in July 2015 in which 
it suggested that defendants could not obtain a “full, fair, and impartial 
adjudication” before administrative law judges.124 Even academic 
commentary jumped on the bandwagon.125 
These critiques culminated in two bills that were introduced in 
Congress. The Due Process Restoration Act, introduced in October 
2015, would empower securities defendants to remove enforcement 
actions to federal court and raise the standard of persuasion before ALJs 
from “preponderance of the evidence” to “clear and convincing.”126 The 
second bill, the Financial CHOICE Act, introduced in June 2016, 
follows the approach of the first bill.127 In addition, the bill would 
prohibit the SEC from imposing an officer and director bar in an 
administrative proceeding,128 presumably to make filing enforcement 
actions in the administrative forum less appealing.129 The bill would also 
give potential defendants the right “to make an in-person presentation” 
before the commissioners in advance of filing an enforcement action.130 
Both bills have lingered in Congress, though the CHOICE Act has 
been revived in the new Congress.131 The SEC, under significant and 
sustained pressure to change its enforcement practices,132 recently 
                                                     
123. Rakoff Address, supra note 17, at 7 (relying on the Wall Street Journal figures in concluding 
that it is “hardly surprising in these circumstances that the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal 
administrative hearings in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, whereas it won only 61% of 
its trials in federal court during the same period”). 
124. Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 19, at 3. 
125. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 20; Barnett, supra note 20; Mark, supra note 20; Jerry W. 
Markham, Regulating the U.S. Treasury Market, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 185, 225 (2016); Platt, supra 
note 92. The two exceptions are Professors Grundfest and Zaring. Grundfest, supra note 30; Zaring, 
supra note 20. 
126. See Garrett Press Release, supra note 27. 
127. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. § 416 (2016), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/choice_act-_discussion_draft.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9CJ6-Q6P5]. 
128. See id. § 418. 
129. See Henning, supra note 27. 
130. See H.R. 5983 § 414. Presumably this would be in addition to the defendant’s right to file a 
Wells Submission in advance of filing the enforcement action. See SEC, DIV. ENFORCEMENT, 
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 20−22 (2016). 
131. See Rachel Witkowski & Ryan Tracy, Republicans Get Ready to Roll Back Dodd-Frank 
Law, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-are-poised-to-roll-out-
their-roll-back-of-dodd-frank-law-1486315341 [https://perma.cc/4XKV-2EHP]. 
132. Half of the comment letters on the proposed amendments to the SEC’s Rules of Practice 
cited the Wall Street Journal news story to contend that securities defendants sued in administrative 
proceeding “lose substantially more frequently than do defendants in federal court.” Brune, supra 
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amended the Rules of Practice that govern litigation before ALJs.133 The 
amendments substantially expand respondents’ procedural rights in 
administrative proceedings. In what I have described elsewhere as 
primary enforcement actions,134 the new rules give respondents ten 
months instead of four to prepare a defense135 and allow respondents to 
take a limited number of depositions,136 which previously they were not 
authorized to do. The amendments give the Enforcement Division and 
the respondent the right to file dispositive motions that are very similar 
to the motions available in civil litigation in federal district court.137 
Hearsay evidence continues to be permitted, so long as it is relevant, 
material, and reliable.138 Because the amendments “fall short of the 
procedural safeguards afforded defendants in federal district court,” 
securities defense attorneys remain concerned about the purported 
“statistical disparity” uncovered by the Wall Street Journal.139 
In addition to revising its Rules of Practice, in May 2015 the SEC 
explained the criteria its staff would use to determine in which forum it 
would bring an action.140 Commentators derided the principles as 
                                                     
note 28, at 1; David M. Zornow, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Comment Letter on 
Proposed Rule on Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Dec. 4, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BGX-D2BL]; 
Richard Foster, Financial Services Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Amendments 
to the Commission’s Rules of Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BGX-D2BL]; Olson, 
supra note 122; Tom Quaadman, Center for Capital Market Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of 
Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6AR-QDJS]. 
133. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,212 (July 29, 
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
134. See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement 
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 928–29 (2016) (describing primary enforcement actions as 
actions seeking to establish that the defendant violated securities laws and to impose monetary 
penalties, injunctions, cease-and-desist orders, and other sanctions). 
135. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)(ii) (2012). 
136. See id. § 201.233(a). 
137. See id. § 201.250. 
138. See id. § 201.320(b). 
139. See Bondi, Ortiz & Wheatley, supra note 29; Olson, supra note 122 (concluding that the 
amendments to the Rules of Practice “fail to provide adequate protection”); Brune, supra note 28, at 
5 (arguing that more significant procedural changes were necessary because “the Commission is 
able to stack the deck in its favor by having its cases adjudicated by its own judges”). 
140. SEC, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM SELECTION IN CONTESTED 
ACTIONS, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contested-
actions.pdf [https://perma.cc/M33U-SBYT]. 
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incoherent,141 and they had a point.142 The SEC has yet to offer more 
definitive sorting principles. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, faced with incessant criticism 
over the perceived disparity in outcomes, the SEC has opted to file more 
actions in court, despite being authorized to litigate actions in the 
administrative forum.143 The shift is significant because actions in court 
are generally more costly to litigate. For an agency that operates on a 
limited budget, every dollar spent litigating actions in court that could be 
litigated more cost-effectively in the administrative forum is a dollar not 
spent prosecuting another securities violation.144 The trade-off may be 
worthwhile if the administrative forum is inappropriate for the case in 
question,145 but it is nevertheless a trade-off with associated costs and 
benefits. 
II. CONTESTED ACTIONS IN SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT 
The news stories have created a perception that ALJs who adjudicate 
securities enforcement actions filed in the administrative forum are 
biased against securities defendants,146 or, in the alternate, that 
procedural rules in the administrative forum make it difficult for 
respondents to defend against charges of securities violations.147 
Moreover, critics have alleged that enforcement staff have taken 
                                                     
141. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Choosing the Battlefield in S.E.C. Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/choosing-the-battlefield-in-sec-cases 
.html [https://perma.cc/8S9Z-RR56] (“The considerations provided by the enforcement division 
about when it will recommend proceeding before an administrative judge rather than in federal 
court shed little light on how the decision will be made.”); Patterson, supra note 113, at 1688. 
142. See Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1148 (explaining that by litigating before ALJs, the SEC 
wanted to take control over the interpretation of federal securities laws); SEC, SEC DIVISION OF 
ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM SELECTION IN CONTESTED ACTIONS (2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M33U-SBYT] (explaining that if a “contested matter is likely to raise unsettled 
and complex legal issues under the federal securities laws . . . obtaining a Commission decision on 
such issues, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may facilitate development of the 
law”). 
143. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2015, at A1 
(reporting that the SEC filed only 11% of contested actions before ALJs in the fourth quarter of 
fiscal year 2015, compared with almost 50% in the second quarter). 
144. Cf. SEC, DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 4 (2016). 
145. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1186 (proposing a list of factors to decide when 
litigation before ALJs may be appropriate in securities enforcement actions). 
146. See Eaglesham, supra note 114; Morgenson, supra note 4; Fuchs, supra note 114. This is 
contrary to what experienced securities practitioners believe. See, e.g., McLucas & Martens, supra 
note 6, at A17 (opining that “there is no evidence that ALJs harbor bias”). 
147. See supra note 113. 
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advantage of the built-in bias and have been steering cases to ALJs to 
increase their likelihood of winning.148 As a result of the perception 
created by the news stories, the SEC amended its Rules of Practice and 
has filed fewer actions in the administrative forum since the controversy 
emerged.149 
Given the real and significant impact of the Wall Street Journal’s 
reporting, its data and analysis are worth re-examining. This Part reports 
the results of an empirical investigation into SEC litigation. Contrary to 
the allegations advanced in the Journal’s report, this Part concludes that 
available data can neither confirm nor refute the charge that the SEC is 
more likely to prevail before ALJs because of their bias in favor of the 
SEC or because of the differences in procedural rules. 
The analyzed data do, however, shed light on two related questions. 
First, the evidence reported in this Part suggests that the SEC has 
significantly increased the number of respondents sued in the 
administrative forum. But, only about half of the increase is attributable 
to the SEC’s exercise of its new power to seek fines against non-
registered persons in the administrative forum; the other half could have 
been filed in the administrative forum before the change.150 Moreover, 
resolution of contested actions by ALJs remains the exception: a large 
majority of contested cases continue to be filed in federal district 
court.151 
Second, there is no robust support for the proposition that the SEC is 
more likely to prevail in like cases before ALJs than in court.152 The 
variation in outcomes by type of forum reported by the Wall Street 
Journal is largely explained by the different types of cases that are 
prosecuted in court and by the fact that individuals, who are more often 
sued in court than firms, are both more likely to contest the SEC’s 
charges and more likely to prevail when they do so.153 
The lack of a robust relationship between the type of forum and case 
outcome reported in this Part is significant because of the widely-
accepted assertions to the contrary.154 As discussed in more detail in Part 
                                                     
148. See e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 14. 
149. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-1444611604, [https://perma.cc/25A 
D-CKN2]. 
150. See discussion infra section II.B. 
151. See discussion infra section II.B. 
152. See Velikonja, supra note 134134, at 976 nn.414–16. 
153. See discussion infra section II.C. 
154. See discussion supra section I.D. 
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III, the conclusions offered here should not be interpreted to imply that 
the type of forum does not matter. There are significant omitted variable 
and selection bias effects that cannot be resolved with the information 
that is available.155 However, the evidence offered in Part II and the 
analysis discussed in Part III do suggest that any questions of whether 
administrative adjudication is fair cannot definitively be resolved with 
empirical evidence. 
A. Data and Methodology 
The data reported and studied in this Article was drawn from Select 
SEC and Market Data Reports (“Reports”) that the SEC prepares 
annually and publishes on its website.156 The Reports include a list of all 
enforcement actions filed during the fiscal year (“FY”), organized by 
subject matter and date.157 According to the Reports, between fiscal 
years 2007 and 2015, the SEC filed about 650 to 800 enforcement 
actions against 1400 to 1900 defendants per year.158 
The Reports list SEC litigation by the legal proceedings filed and not 
by the defendant.159 In previous work, I reported that the SEC often 
targets multiple defendants in a single enforcement action and that the 
same defendant can be targeted for the same securities violation in two 
or more enforcement actions.160 This practice renders the accounting of 
securities enforcement by the number of enforcement actions filed 
invalid and unreliable.161 To remedy the problem, I reviewed each 
enforcement action listed in the Reports for fiscal years 2007 to 2015 
and pulled up the relevant documents in PACER or Bloomberg Law for 
civil actions and in Westlaw or the SEC’s website for administrative 
proceedings. The documents were reviewed, and the information coded 
                                                     
155. See discussion infra section III.A. 
156. See Reports and Publications, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/reports [https://perma.cc/LW33-
TAFQ]. 
157. See, e.g., SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2015, 4–21 tbl.3 (2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/select-sec-and-market-data/secstats2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BHY9-8D7G]. 
158. The source of this information is the SEC annual reports and Select SEC and Market Data 
reports. See Reports and Publications, SEC (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/reports?aId= 
TheSubtype_t1&TheYear=&TheSubtype=Select+SEC+and+Market+Data&TheDivision= [https:// 
perma.cc/8VRH-WZ3H]. 
159. See, e.g., SEC , SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2014, at 3–20 tbls. 2–3 (2015) 
(reporting aggregate information and a complete list of enforcement actions filed in FY 2014). 
160. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 933–37. 
161. See id. at 932–57 (discussing the various reasons that reported SEC enforcement statistics 
are invalid and unreliable). 
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and tabulated by defendants, not by enforcement actions.162 The initial 
coding excludes actions targeting delinquent filing and contempt 
proceedings.163 This yields a set of actions against 10,967 defendants. 
In the next step, I excluded certain groups of defendants and actions 
to ensure that the cases compared are, in fact, comparable. First, the data 
only include defendants charged with securities violations and do not 
include relief (or nominal) defendants, whom the SEC targeted because 
they received ill-gotten gain but did not violate securities laws.164 
Although relief defendants often contest charges that the SEC brings, 
they are, by definition, not securities violators that the SEC punishes. 
Moreover, the SEC sues virtually all relief defendants in court.165 
Because their likelihood of prevailing against the SEC is driven by 
different factors than the success of securities defendants, including 
them in the analysis would not help to assess whether ALJs were more 
likely to rule for the SEC than judges. Removing relief defendants 
reduced the data set to 9967 defendants. 
Second, only defendants targeted in primary enforcement actions are 
included,166 not respondents in follow-on and secondary actions. A 
primary enforcement action is one in which the SEC targets a defendant 
for violating securities laws and seeks an injunction or a cease-and-desist 
order, and perhaps a fine, disgorgement, and other remedies.167 Primary 
enforcement actions are filed in court and in the administrative forum.168 
By contrast, the SEC files follow-on and secondary actions in the 
                                                     
162. Searches for civil actions were done in Bloomberg Law database (which makes PACER 
available), and searches for administrative actions were done on the SEC’s website and in Westlaw. 
163. Delinquent filing actions are filed in administrative proceedings and look very different from 
other primary actions. Defendants are usually defunct entities, the remedy is revocation of the 
common stock, and most actions are decided by default. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 940–45. 
Studies of SEC enforcement practices usually exclude delinquent filing actions. See STEPHEN CHOI, 
SARA E. GILLEY & DAVID F. MARCUS, NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS. AND CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AGAINST PUBLIC COMPANY DEFENDANTS, FISCAL 
YEARS 2010–2015, at 11 (2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/SEC-Enforcement-
Activity-FY2010-FY2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJE-MVNB]. 
164. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 946–47. 
165. Data on file with author. See also Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1145 n.2. 
166. The SEC divides enforcement actions into three categories: independent enforcement 
actions, follow-on actions, and delinquent filing actions. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015 (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-245.html [https://perma.cc/4NYC-JU3E]. The category 
independent actions combines what I call primary actions and secondary actions. I have continued 
to use the different nomenclature to avoid double-counting respondents in secondary actions. 
167. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 928–29. 
168. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 130 fig. 1. 
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administrative forum only.169 Both types of actions are second (and 
sometimes third) proceedings against the same respondent for the same 
violation.170 Follow-on actions are based on injunctions or convictions 
issued in earlier proceedings, and so respondents are collaterally 
estopped from contesting the factual basis of the follow-on action.171 
The SEC should win follow-on actions.172 As a result, the SEC’s 
likelihood of success in a follow-on action is considerably higher than in 
a primary enforcement action. The SEC files few secondary actions and 
virtually all are either filed as settled actions or are settled during the 
proceeding.173 
The compiled data includes actions against 8021 securities defendants 
in primary enforcement actions. Of those, 5832 were prosecuted in 
federal district court and 2189 in the administrative forum. In addition to 
information on the forum in which the action was filed, I collected 
information on the identity of the defendant (individual or firm); the type 
of the violation; when the action was filed and when it was resolved or 
whether it is still ongoing; what was the method of resolution (i.e., filed 
as settled, settled, default, trial, summary judgment, dismissal, ongoing); 
whether the case was accompanied by and/or based on a criminal action; 
and the outcome.174 In terms of outcomes, I collected information on 
                                                     
169. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 929, 935. 
170. A follow-on action is a second enforcement action filed against the same defendants for the 
same violation. It is based on the first enforcement action in which the defendant was fined and 
enjoined and seeks to impose a professional or associational bar. 
The collected data includes follow-on actions against 1854 defendants and secondary actions 
against 89 defendants. A subset of follow-on actions is based on a criminal conviction alone, and so 
the follow-on action is the only proceeding before the SEC. These actions were also excluded. For a 
detailed methodology, see id. at 925–32. 
171. This is true whether the case was litigated or resolved by settlement. See Richard S. Kern & 
Charles Wilkins, Initial Decision Release No. 281, 2005 WL 924285 (Apr. 21, 2005), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/id281jtk.htm [https://perma.cc/D6QT-JG8Y]. 
172. Velikonja, supra note 134, at 963 (reporting that only defendants whose underlying 
conviction or injunction was vacated prevailed against the SEC in a contested follow-on action). 
173. Secondary actions, sometimes referred to as cease-and-desist actions, are best understood as 
a concession to the respondent. Instead of filing one action in court seeking a fine and an injunction, 
the Enforcement Division files two: a civil action seeking monetary penalties and an administrative 
action seeking a cease-and-desist order. Id. at 929. This is a concession to the settling defendant 
because cease-and-desist orders that are imposed in administrative proceedings generally tend to 
have less significant consequences than obey-the-law injunctions imposed in court actions. See id. at 
929–32. Of eighty-nine actions, only six were not settled; of those six, three were decided by 
default, two were consolidated with actions filed in court, and one was voluntarily dismissed. Data 
on file with author. 
174. For civil actions, I performed docket searches and reviewed relevant documents as available 
in PACER and Bloomberg Law. For administrative actions, the search was done in the SEC’s 
database of administrative proceedings and in Westlaw. 
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whether the SEC prevailed on at least one count of liability (decisions in 
court cases are often bifurcated),175 whether the finding of liability was 
based on collateral estoppel by a criminal conviction or plea, and the 
sanction that was imposed. The coding of outcomes includes all actions 
that were filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015 and concluded with a 
substantive disposition on liability by September 15, 2016. 
Table 1 below reports summary statistics on primary enforcement 
actions filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015. Both firms and individuals are 
significantly more likely to be sued in court than before ALJs, but 
individuals are statistically more likely than firms to be sued in court.176 
 
Table 1:  
Summary Statistics of Filings and Case Resolutions 
 
 Court Frequency AP Frequency 
Filings     
Individuals 3876 77.5% 1122 22.5% 
Firms 1952 64.7% 1067 35.3% 
Filed Settled Actions     
Individuals 1063 27.4% 771 68.6% 
Firms 429 21.9% 865 81.0% 
As shown in the summary statistics table, firms are generally more 
likely to settle during the investigation than are individuals, but less so 
when the action is filed in court. Only a small minority of enforcement 
actions are contested to the end and ultimately decided by a dispositive 
motion or after trial. Of the cases that are not filed as settled, more than 
half ultimately settle. Of the remainder, most are decided by default or 
voluntarily dismissed because the defendant died, ceased to exist, could 
not be served, or some similar reason, and only a sliver are contested to 
the end and decided by a judge, a jury, or an ALJ.177 
                                                     
175. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., SEC Div. of Enf’t, Remarks at University of Texas School of 
Law’s Government Enforcement Institute: The SEC’s Cooperation Program: Reflections on Five 
Years of Experience, (May 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/sec-cooperation-program 
.html [https://perma.cc/2N2L-SH4M] (describing the use of bifurcated settlements in cases where 
defendants agree to cooperate with the SEC). 
176. The difference is statistically significant at p<0.01. 
177. See infra Table 3 and discussion in section II.C. 
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B. Has the SEC Shifted Enforcement to the Administrative Forum? 
During fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, the SEC reported 
filing many more enforcement actions in administrative proceedings 
than in previous years.178 According to the Reports, in FY 2012 the SEC 
filed 63% of enforcement actions against 52% of defendants in 
administrative proceedings.179 By FY 2014, the SEC filed 81% of 
enforcement actions against 70% of defendants in administrative 
proceedings.180 A shift on that scale in two years is highly unusual, and 
it has attracted considerable critical attention.181 
The increase in the share of enforcement actions filed in the 
administrative forum is due to several confounding factors. The statistics 
included in the Reports include delinquent filing actions and follow-on 
proceedings. Since 2010, the SEC has increased both;182 both groups of 
cases have always been filed in the administrative forum.183 Second, 
since FY 2013 the SEC has increasingly filed actions that are settled 
during the investigation in the administrative forum.184 In FY 2010, 
before Dodd-Frank’s adoption, the SEC filed 32% of settled 
enforcement actions in the administrative forum.185 By FY 2015, the 
SEC filed 83% of settled enforcement actions in the administrative 
forum.186 For various reasons, when the matter is settled during the 
investigation, both the SEC and settling defendants usually prefer to file 
the settled action in the administrative forum.187 
                                                     
178. Compare SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL 2010, at 3 tbl.2 (2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/98PX-F22B] (reporting 429 actions 
filed in administrative proceedings) with SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL 2014, at 2 
tbl.1 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MSL-RC5A] 
[hereinafter SEC, FY 2014] (reporting 610 actions filed in administrative proceedings). 
179. See SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2012, at 3 tbl.2. 
180. See SEC, FY 2014, supra note 178, at 3 tbl.2. 
181. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 20, at 1174; Platt, supra note 92, at 9 (suggesting that court 
losses “caused the agency to shift” to administrative adjudication); Michael Dvorak, SEC 
Administrative Proceedings and Equal Protection “Class of One” Challenges: Evaluating 
Concerns About SEC Forum Choices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1195 (2015); Eaglesham, supra 
note 114 (quoting former SEC Commissioner Grundfest observing that this is “a fundamental 
change”). 
182. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 978, 980. 
183. In both, the SEC succeeds at much higher rates than in primary enforcement actions, but its 
success is not generally considered as problematic. As noted above, these actions were not included 
in the statistical comparison of outcomes reported in section II.C.3. 
184. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 129. 
185. Id. at 130 fig.1, 137 tbls. 1−3. 
186. This is measured by the number of defendants, not actions. See id. at 130. 
187. See id. at 126. 
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By contrast, the increase in the number and the share of contested 
actions188 filed in the administrative forum has been relatively modest. 
In FY 2010, the fiscal year during which the Dodd-Frank Act became 
effective, the SEC filed contested enforcement actions against 504 
defendants overall.189 Of these, forty defendants (8%) were sued in the 
administrative forum and 464 (92%) in court. In FY 2015, the SEC filed 
contested actions against 577 defendants. Of those, 105 defendants 
(18%) were sued in the administrative forum and 472 (82%) in court. As 
shown in Figure 1 below, the change in the number and the share of 
defendants who are forced to litigate before ALJs is relatively small, but 
the difference is statistically significant. 
 
Figure 1:  
Filings in Contested Cases by Year 190  
 
 
The increase in the number of contested case filings in administrative 
proceedings is not due entirely to the SEC’s newly-expanded 
jurisdiction. A review of all contested orders instituting administrative 
proceedings between FY 2011 and 2015 reveals that a significant 
                                                     
188. The term “contested action” in this context is meant to include actions that were not filed as 
settled actions. Many of actions that were initially contested ultimately settled. 
189. Data on file with author. 
190. The figure reports the number of defendants targeted in contested actions. 
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majority, 294 of 403, could have been filed in the administrative forum 
before the statutory change.191 These include actions against registered 
investment advisors, broker dealers, and transfer agents for violations of 
various regulatory and disclosure requirements; they also include stop 
orders targeting false registered offerings of securities. Thus, about half 
of the increase in the number of contested actions filed in the 
administrative forum is attributable to the SEC’s exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, not to the Dodd-Frank amendment.192 
However, the other half of contested actions filed in the 
administrative forum since FY 2011, about 109,193 were filed pursuant to 
the SEC’s new authority. That number certainly would have been higher 
absent the controversy about ALJ bias.194 As suggested by the figures 
reported in Table 2, the bulk of these cases target securities offering and 
issuer disclosure and reporting, not insider trading, as some of the 
commentary has suggested.195 Most of these cases are still ongoing, so—
despite the effort in this Article—it is somewhat premature to examine 
the SEC’s track record in litigation before ALJs after Dodd-Frank. 
As a general matter, the SEC has not used expanded jurisdiction of 
ALJs to advance novel theories of securities violations in contested 
administrative proceedings, as has been suggested.196 Most first-of-its-
                                                     
191. Data was hand-coded, so the number is best understood as an approximation and not an 
exact figure. 
192. Between FY 2007 and 2010, the SEC sued on average 38.75 respondents in administrative 
proceedings. Assuming similar trends were to continue, the SEC would sue 194 respondents in 
administrative proceedings between FY 2011 and 2015. Instead, it sued 403 for an increase of 209 
over the pre-Dodd-Frank average. Of those, 100 were defendants who could have been sued in 
administrative proceedings before Dodd-Frank. 
193. The data was hand-coded, so the number is best understood as an approximation and not an 
exact figure. 
194. See Eaglesham, supra note 143, at A1 (reporting that the SEC filed only 11% of contested 
actions before ALJs in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2015, compared with almost 50% in the second 
quarter). 
195. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 20, at 1155; Yin Wilczek, SEC to Pursue More Insider Trading 
Cases in Administrative Forum, Director Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 13, 2014), 
http://www.bna.com/sec-pursue-insider-n17179891282/ [https://perma.cc/7TTW-V2Z4]. In fact, 
only seven defendants who contested charges of insider trading were sued in administrative 
proceedings between 2011 and 2015. 
196. To be fair, the contention is not that the SEC has often used ALJs to secure a favorable re-
interpretation of the law. Rather, the contention is that the Commission could adopt novel legal 
intepretations in cases it adjudicates on appeal from an ALJ’s initial decision and then demand 
Chevron deference. See Andrew N. Vollmer, SEC Revanchism and the Expansion of Primary 
Liability Under Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 273 (2015) (discussing the 
SEC’s demand for Chevron deference to a novel interpretation of securities laws in the SEC’s 
administrative case against Flannery). 
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kind actions were filed as settled actions, not as contested actions.197 
Instead, as shown in Table 2, the most common charges are similar to 
the charges that the SEC brings in court: fraudulent disclosure, offering 
of unregistered securities, and violations related to pooled investment 
vehicles. 
Table 2: 
The Number of Defendants Sued in Administrative Proceedings  
by Subject Matter Category 
 
 2007–10 
average 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Broker Dealer 13.75 15 27 15 10 11 
Investment 
Adviser 
10.75 15 35 34 26 28 
Insider Trading 0.5 3 0 0 3 1 
Issuer 
Reporting 
3.25 6 3 12 19 13 
Market 
Manipulation 
2 2 3 1 0 2 
Securities 
Offering 
2.5 5 1 20 37 45 
Other 6 1 3 0 2 5 
       All Contested 
in APs 
38.75 47 72 82 97 105 
All Contested 
in Court 
518.75 532 535 409 316 472 
 
In sum, since FY 2011 the SEC has started litigating more 
aggressively in the administrative forum in both settled and contested 
actions. The increase is considerable and statistically significant. But the 
overall number of cases litigated before ALJs remains small compared 
with the number of cases litigated in court, as shown in Figure 1 above. 
Moreover, a significant portion of the increase is not attributable to the 
use of the SEC’s new authority to sue non-registered firms and 
individuals in the administrative forum. Since FY 2011, the SEC has 
                                                     
197. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks 2015 (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spch022015mjw.html [https://perma.cc/B7N6-YUU9]. 
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been aggressive in targeting violations that could have been litigated in 
the administrative forum before the Dodd-Frank amendment.198 
In other words, since FY 2011, the SEC has changed the mix of the 
cases it prosecutes, and many of the contested cases it has litigated 
before ALJs have been those that can only be prosecuted in the 
administrative forum. At the same time, the SEC has used its new 
authority to sue before ALJs more than one hundred defendants that it 
could have sued only in court before the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
development is important and one that invites and deserves further 
study. 
C. Is There a Disparity in Outcomes Depending on Where the 
Enforcement Action Is Filed? 
The previous section analyzed changes in filing practices after the 
Dodd-Frank amendment; this one analyzes case outcomes using the 
same data. The section begins with an overview of outcomes in SEC 
enforcement actions. It then defines important variables that are 
necessary to test the claim that the SEC is more likely to prevail when it 
litigates before ALJs than in court. 
The Wall Street Journal report that compared the SEC’s success rates 
in court and before ALJs did not perform any statistical tests of 
significance.199 This section uses both a chi-squared test and logistic 
regression. The chi-squared test compares success rates by venue 
without controlling for other potentially significant variables. By 
contrast, in logistic regression, one is able to perform multivariate 
analysis by controlling for (i.e., holding constant) selected qualities.200 In 
other words, logistic regression allows one to test whether the higher 
likelihood of success before ALJs is due to the type of forum or some 
other case characteristic. This section uses both statistical methods for a 
very limited purpose, namely to test whether there is a robust association 
between the type of forum in which a case is litigated and the 
outcome.201 
                                                     
198. For example, between 2011 and 2015, the SEC prosecuted thirty-one defendants in stop 
order proceedings, compared with nine between 2007 and 2010. A stop order proceeding is not 
settled or contested: it is an action taken ex officio. Data on file with author. 
199. See Eaglesham, supra note 114. 
200. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil 
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1219 (2013) (explaining the differences between a chi-squared 
test and logistic regression). 
201. This Article does not purport to draw any inferences about settled cases and so does not get 
into the Priest-Klein hypothesis or its critics. See Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences 
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1. Overview of Outcomes in Securities Enforcement 
As is true for litigation generally,202 the vast majority of the SEC’s 
cases ultimately settle. But contrary to the common view, a minority of 
defendants have settled with the SEC by the time the action is 
initiated.203 Of cases filed between fiscal years 2007 and 2015, 3124 of 
8021 defendants (39%) settled by the time the SEC filed a public 
enforcement action. Settlement rates vary from year to year: during the 
study period, in FY 2009, 32% of defendants settled at initiation; in FY 
2014, 48% of defendants did. 
As noted, most defendants ultimately settle. More than half of 
defendants that initially contested the charges settled during the public 
proceeding, resulting in an overall settlement rate of around 75%.204 
Only a small minority of defendants, 283 of 8021 defendants (3.6%), 
litigated their cases to trial. For actions resolved by a third-party 
adjudicator, it is more common that they are decided by default (721 
defendants or 9%) or by summary disposition (364 defendants or 4.5%) 
than by trial. 
  
                                                     
from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (2014); George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
202. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1723 
(2012) (observing that “most cases terminate in settlement”). 
203. Several authors have reported—incorrectly—that the SEC’s settlement rate exceeds 90%. 
See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law, 
82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 505–06 (2013); Ross MacDonald, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a 
New SEC Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 421 (2012) (stating that the SEC had settled 
98% of cases in recent years); David M. Weiss, Reexamining SEC’s Use of Obey-the-Law 
Injunctions, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 239, 239–40 (2006); Roger Parloff, The Judge Who Slapped 
Citi, FORTUNE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/30/judge-jed-rakoff-
citigroup-sec/ [https://perma.cc/RW75-AYNC]. 
204. Of the cases filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015 and resolved by September 15, 2016, 
defendants settled in 78% of cases (the denominator to calculate the overall settlement rate does not 
include ongoing cases). 
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Table 3: 
Case Disposition (2007–15) 205 
 
 Court Frequency Administrative 
Proceeding 
Frequency 
Filed Settled 1492 25.6% 1632 74.6% 
Settled 2292 39.3% 272 12.3% 
Default 636 10.9% 85 3.9% 
Dismissal206     
Involuntary 29 0.5% 0 0.0% 
Voluntary 
(Def. win) 
47 
 
0.8% 
 
1 0.0% 
 
Procedural 
(no win) 
141 2.4% 14 0.6% 
Summary 
Disposition 
357 6.2% 7 0.3% 
Trial/ALJ207 127 2.2% 156 7.1% 
Ongoing (i.e., 
no decision) 
711 12.2% 22 1.0% 
     Total 5832  2189  
In light of the variety in possible case outcomes, one can analyze the 
SEC’s success rate by type of forum in a variety of ways. First, one 
could look at outcome after trial in court and before ALJs, like the news 
reports to date have done. The first news story, reported in October 
2013, noted that the SEC prevailed in 88% of cases filed before ALJs 
and in 63% of cases filed in court during FY 2011.208 The Wall Street 
Journal story, published a year later, reported that between October 
2013 and September 2014, “the SEC won all six contested 
                                                     
205.  The table includes cases filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015 and resolved by September 15, 
2016. 
206.  “Involuntary dismissals” are those issued by a third-party adjudicator. “Voluntary 
dismissals” are those by SEC motion where the case was dismissed because the SEC could not 
prevail. “Procedural dismissals” are dismissals that were ordered by SEC motion because the case 
could not continue (e.g., defendant died or dissolved, voluntarily complied, settled another matter), 
and do not suggest that the defendant prevailed. 
207.  The category “Trial/ALJ” includes dispositions in 51 cases that are still ongoing but where 
an ALJ had issued an Initial Decision and the defendant, the Enforcement Division, or both 
appealed the Initial Decision to the Commission. This was done to test the charge that ALJs, by 
virtue of being employees of the SEC, are biased in its favor. 
208. Morgenson, supra note 4. 
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administrative hearings where verdicts were issued, but only 61%—11 
out of 18—federal-court trials.”209 The same article noted that in the 
preceding two fiscal years, the SEC won 90% and 100% of 
administrative cases and 70% and 67% of trials in court.210 In a follow-
up story, the Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC had been steering 
cases increasingly to ALJs and prevailed in 90% of cases litigated before 
ALJs, compared with 69% of cases tried in federal court.211 The news 
stories do not explain the methodology used, so the effort to reproduce 
the newspapers’ analyses is a best guess based on the available data. 
Table 4 shows the SEC’s success rates in cases decided after trial: the 
SEC prevails in fewer than 83% of jury and bench trials in court but in 
89% of cases decided by ALJs.212 The SEC prevails in over 96% of 
court cases decided by summary judgment and in 100% of ALJ 
summary dispositions. The SEC also loses at motion to dismiss in court 
but not before ALJs. The latter is due to the fact that the motion to 
dismiss was not available in ALJ litigation until July 2016. Whether one 
compares success rates after trial or at any stage of litigation, the 
difference in outcomes in cases filed in court and in administrative 
forum is much smaller than the one reported by the Wall Street Journal, 
and is not statistically significant.213 
In fact, the only way to reconstruct the Wall Street Journal’s 
figures—90% success rate before ALJ and 69% success rate in court—is 
by including trials and involuntary dismissals in the tally, but not 
summary judgments.214 But doing that would be a mistake, as any 
lawyer knows. Summary judgment resolves the case on the merits, just 
like a trial. Omitting summary judgments also biases the comparison. As 
reported in Table 4, nearly all summary judgments are issued by courts 
and not ALJs. The SEC is considerably more likely to prevail in a case 
decided by summary judgment than it is when the case goes to trial.215 If 
                                                     
209. Eaglesham, supra note 14. 
210. See id. 
211. Eaglesham, supra note 114. 
212. Prevailing on at least one of the counts is coded as a win by the SEC. This is consistent with 
the approach adopted by the news stories as well as by the SEC annual reports. See discussion infra 
at notes 238–37 and accompanying text. 
213. The p-value in a chi-square test is 0.177. 
214. Using the numbers in cases resolved after trial and motions to dismiss reported in Table 4, 
one obtains a 67% success rate in court and 90% before ALJs. 
215. The reason that the SEC prevails at summary judgment at such high rates is not bias on the 
part of federal district judges, it is the fact that many of its enforcement actions are well founded. In 
addition to defendants who were convicted before the resolution of the summary judgment motion, 
fifty-five were later convicted or pleaded guilty to securities fraud related to the same set of facts as 
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one compares success rates in all actions decided by a judge or an ALJ 
over the SEC’s objection, the SEC’s success rates are 87.5% in court and 
89.6% before an ALJ. The difference is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 4:  
Likelihood of Success by Type of Litigation Forum 
 
 Decided 
in Court 
SEC 
win 
Win 
rate 
Decided 
in AP 
SEC 
win 
Win 
rate 
(1) Trial/ ALJ216 127 105 82.7% 156 139 89.1% 
(2) Summary 
Disposition 
357 344 96.4% 7 7 100.0% 
(3) Involuntary 
Dismissal  
29 0 0.0% 0 0 n. a. 
(4) Voluntary 
Dismissal  
47 0 0.0% 1 0 0.0% 
       Total (1–3) 513 449 87.5% 163 146 89.6% 
       Total (1–4) 560 449 80.2% 164 146 89.0% 
To this one must add two important caveats. First, sometimes the 
reason that the SEC prevails at summary judgment is that the defendant 
is fighting a losing battle. In enforcement actions that prosecute offering 
fraud schemes (e.g., Ponzi, pyramid, and like schemes), penny stock 
frauds, and insider trading, in particular, the SEC often sues defendants 
who are facing criminal charges for the same misconduct. As defendants 
plead guilty or are convicted, the SEC moves for summary judgment on 
liability in the civil case. In 80 of 344 summary judgments at which the 
SEC prevailed, the order granting summary judgment for the SEC was 
based on the defendant’s earlier criminal conviction or guilty plea. 
                                                     
the summary judgment motion. While defendants usually can and do contest the allegations in the 
SEC’s complaint, the fact that they were later criminally sanctioned for the same misconduct goes a 
long way towards explaining why the SEC is so successful at summary judgment. 
It does happen that a defendant prevails against the SEC at summary judgment by lying to the 
enforcement staff. One such defendant was later indicted for the same violation. See Spanish 
Investor Indicted for Impeding SEC Investigation and Litigation Regarding $4.6 Million Insider 
Trading Scheme, Litigation Release No. 23591, SEC Docket (CCH) 3634701 (July 5, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23591.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZHD-PEMW]. 
216.  The category “Trial/ALJ” includes dispositions in 51 cases that are still ongoing but where 
an ALJ had issued an Initial Decision and the defendant, the Enforcement Division, or both 
appealed the Initial Decision to the Commission. This was done for two reasons: first, to be 
consistent with the Wall Street Journal’s method, and second, to test the charge that ALJs, by virtue 
of being employees of the SEC, are biased in its favor. 
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Because convicted defendants are collaterally estopped from denying the 
allegations related to the criminal charges in the SEC enforcement 
action, the court usually grants the SEC’s request for summary 
judgment.217 Excluding these summary judgments from the comparison 
of success rates lowers the SEC’s success rate in court to 369 of 433, or 
85%—only marginally lower than the SEC’s 90% success rate in the 
administrative forum and not statistically significant. 
Second, not all dismissals are created equal. Enforcement actions are 
rarely resolved by a contested motion to dismiss. If a case is dismissed, 
it is usually because the statute of limitations has run,218 or because the 
court has no personal jurisdiction over the defendant.219 Vacatur, an 
order setting aside a judgment or vacating the legal proceeding, is 
similarly rare; lower court dispositions or settlements are vacated either 
when a higher court reverses the district or appellate court’s judgment, 
as occurred in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gabelli v. SEC,220 or 
when a higher court reverses a related decision, as occurred after the 
Second Circuit decided the United States v. Newman insider-trading 
case.221 After Newman, district courts vacated settlements and summary 
judgment decisions rendered against ten defendants in SEC enforcement 
actions, and they may vacate more.222 These dismissals are included in 
Tables 3 and 4 as involuntary dismissals against the SEC (i.e., as 
defendant “wins” by involuntary dismissal). 
Despite a handful of highly-publicized involuntary dismissals, a large 
majority of dismissals are voluntary.223 The SEC may file a motion to 
dismiss the action without prejudice and without cost (i.e., each side 
bears its litigation expenses) for a variety of reasons. More often than 
not, a voluntary dismissal does not imply that the SEC lost. The SEC 
routinely moves to dismiss an action against a defendant who died 
                                                     
217. Courts grant the SEC’s summary judgment motions on liability, leaving the only remaining 
question, on appropriate remedies, for further proceedings. More often than not, the court imposes 
an injunction and associational bar, but waives or gives credit for fines, forfeiture, and restitution 
ordered in the criminal case. 
218. SEC v. Graham, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2014). The decision was recently in part 
reversed on appeal. See SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2016). 
219. SEC v. Sharef, 924 F.Supp.2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
220. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013). 
221. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
222. See Ed Beeson, Newman’s Domino Effect: 12 Cases on Edge After Cert. Denial, LAW360 
(Oct. 13, 2015, 9:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/713046/newman-s-domino-effect-12-
cases-on-edge-after-cert-denial [https://perma.cc/7W77-74YJ]. 
223. Details on dismissals are shown supra Table 3. 
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during the proceeding or ceased operations.224 These dismissals are 
neither wins nor losses for the SEC, and they are categorized as 
neither.225 Voluntary dismissals and postponements for failure to locate 
and/or serve the defendant because he fled to Tonga226 or Argentina,227 
likewise, are neither wins nor losses for the SEC, even if the defendant 
ultimately escapes liability. Similarly, actions that the SEC drops 
because the defendant was convicted,228 settled a related enforcement 
action,229 or complied with the SEC’s demand voluntarily230 should not 
count as losses for the SEC. Finally, when the SEC closes a receivership 
in court, it often voluntarily dismisses enforcement actions against 
entities after prevailing against the individual who used the entity to 
perpetrate his scheme. These dismissals are essentially “wins” for the 
SEC, rather than “losses,” but were nonetheless excluded from the 
analysis.231 
At the same time, at least some of the voluntary dismissals should be 
understood as acknowledgements by the Enforcement Division that the 
case is unwinnable. For example, the SEC sometimes amends the 
complaint and drops a defendant from the complaint without 
explanation.232 At other times, the SEC files a settled motion to dismiss 
the action without prejudice and without cost. While the motion usually 
does not explain the reason, news articles and press releases published 
contemporaneously often explain that the SEC dismissed the action 
                                                     
224. See, e.g., LPB Capital & Gary J. Pappas, Exchange Act Release No. 69885, 2013 WL 
3271085 (June 28, 2013) (dismissing the proceeding in light of Pappas’ death, LPB Capital’s 
request to terminate investment adviser registration, and inability to pay disgorgement or penalties). 
225. That is, they are excluded from the analysis of contested actions. 
226. Christopher A.T. Pedras, Admin. Proc. Rulings No. 3773 (ALJ Apr. 8, 2016) (postponement 
order) https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljorders/2016/ap-3773.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLJ4-SNSG]. 
227. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, SEC v. Walters, No. 1:09-cv-337 (D. Colo. May 14, 2015). 
228. Order for Judgment, SEC v. Shields & Geodynamics, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-2121 (D. Colo. Mar. 
16, 2015). 
229. John Briner, Securities Act Release No. 9921, Exchange Act Release No. 75951, 2015 WL 
5472562 (Sept. 18, 2015) (order dismissing Chris Whetman, CPA from proceeding). 
230. Registration Statement of Sahas Technologies LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9189, 2011 
WL 553599 (Feb. 17, 2011). 
231. If they were coded as “wins,” they would be included in the Expanded model below. This 
would increase the SEC’s success rate in court and would render the predictor ALJ no longer 
statistically significant. See infra section II.C.3 and Table 6. 
232. See Amended Complaint, SEC v. Aragon Capital Advisors LLC, No. 1:07-cv-919 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 22, 2007) (listing Noga Delshad as defendant); Second Amended Complaint, Aragon, No. 
1:07-cv-919 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2010) (dropping Noga Delshad from the list of defendants). 
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because it could not advance a successful case.233 Voluntary dismissals 
that should properly be understood as SEC “losses” are most common in 
insider trading actions, and they were included in some of the analyses 
of case outcomes reported below. 
Overall, 232 cases against defendants sued between 2007 and 2015 
were dismissed. I reviewed all 232 cases. In addition, I searched for 
accompanying news stories to find a reason for the dismissal. The 
actions were hand coded for whether the dismissal was by SEC motion 
or whether the SEC objected to the dismissal (i.e., voluntary or 
involuntary): 29 dismissals were involuntary234 and 203 voluntary. 
Voluntary dismissals were further coded for whether voluntary dismissal 
was best understood as a “win” by the defendant. In 155 of 203 
voluntary dismissals neither side prevailed, and the case was dismissed 
due to death, voluntary compliance, or other external circumstances. In 
48 of 203 voluntary dismissals, either contemporaneous SEC filings, 
press releases or news reports indicated that the SEC moved to dismiss 
the case because it did not believe it could prevail, or there was no 
information; these cases were coded as defendant “wins.”235 If all 48 
voluntary dismissals coded as defendant wins are included in the 
comparison, the SEC prevailed against 449 of 560 defendants in court 
(80% success rate) and against 146 of 164 defendants in administrative 
proceedings (89% success rate). Unlike all other reported differences in 
success rates, this difference is statistically significant.236 This result 
does not imply that ALJs are biased in favor of the SEC; it merely 
suggests that a defendant sued in court might fare better, in part because 
the SEC is more likely to dismiss the action voluntarily. 
But even this conclusion is premature. The analysis thus far does not 
account for any case or defendant characteristics that could explain the 
difference in success rates. The section does suggest, however, that a 
comparison of outcomes is more complicated than suggested by the Wall 
Street Journal and that the numbers the newspapers have reported are 
not credible. 
                                                     
233. Such voluntary dismissals are celebrated in the press as SEC losses. See, e.g., James B. 
Stewart, Another Fumble by the S.E.C. on Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, at B1 (reporting that 
the SEC, “in a rare public about-face,” asked a judge to dismiss charges against a defendant). 
234. These include insider trading actions that were originally settled or decided by summary 
judgment but were vacated post-Newman. 
235. All told, about 20 cases had no information that would help with coding. All were coded as 
defendant wins, but regressions in section II.C.3 report the results separately, with these 20 cases 
coded as defendant wins and excluding them from the model as neutral voluntary dismissals. 
236. The chi-square statistic is 5.6706; the p-value is .01725. This result is significant at p<0.05. 
The result is the same if summary judgments based on criminal convictions are excluded. 
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2. Description of the Variables 
Comparisons to this point do not control for anything other than 
where the case is litigated and whether it is based on a prior conviction. 
But commentators as well as SEC representatives have pointed out that 
cases vary significantly along other dimensions.237 For example, many 
of the SEC’s losses at trial have been in insider trading cases. To test the 
hypothesis that the type of forum matters, I used logistic regression, in 
which I controlled for case and defendant characteristics. This section 
provides more detail on how the response variable was constructed and 
what predictors in addition to the type of forum were used in the 
regressions reported in section II.C.3. Part III discusses the limitations of 
the model, in particular the inability to control for case quality, and 
discusses the implications of the results in light of that limitation. 
a. The Response Variable: What Counts as “Success”? 
The SEC itself measures success as the percentage of defendants in 
enforcement actions against which the SEC prevails on at least one of 
the counts.238 Alternately, success can be defined more narrowly to 
record as SEC wins only those cases where the SEC prevails on the most 
serious charges, such as violations of scienter-based provisions of 
securities laws,239 or even more narrowly to record as successes only 
those cases where the SEC receives all of the relief it seeks.240 This 
Article adopts the SEC’s own definition of success. It does so because it 
is the definition adopted in the news stories that have reported on the 
SEC’s success rates and the primary purpose of the study is to question 
the analysis using the same data. 
b. Predictors of Success 
The comparisons of success rates reported in section II.C.1 compare 
outcomes by type of forum without controlling for any other aspects of 
case quality. But factors other than the forum the case is filed in likely 
affect the SEC’s likelihood of success. The logistic regression analysis 
                                                     
237. See Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1175–84. 
238. See, e.g., SEC, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 27 (2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/K674-G688] (reporting that the 
SEC prevailed in 92% of enforcement actions resolved in FY 2010). 
239. Under that definition of success, cases where the SEC prevails only on the subsidiary, 
negligence-based, or strict-liability counts would count as losses for the SEC. 
240. See Zaring, supra note 20, at 1176. 
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reported in section II.C.3 includes four independent variables that were 
expected to be significant predictors241 of the likelihood of success: the 
type of forum in which the action is filed, whether the defendant is a 
firm or an individual, whether the action is accompanied by and/or based 
on a criminal conviction or plea, and the subject matter category of the 
enforcement action. I also collected information on the year in which the 
actions were filed and resolved and on who was SEC Chair at the time 
the action was filed, but these were not significant predictors of success 
and so were not included in the regression analyses reported below. 
This section provides additional detail on why I selected the 
predictors included in the regression and how I collected the relevant 
information. First, this Article tests the Wall Street Journal’s claim that 
the forum in which the case is filed is significantly correlated with the 
likelihood of success, so that variable was included in all regressions. 
Second, as suggested by information included in Table 1, individuals 
are significantly more likely than firms to contest an enforcement action. 
The reasons vary but one important reason is that individuals are much 
more likely than firms to face significant bars and collateral 
consequences that result from a finding of liability.242 Because 
individuals are more likely to contest charges, one would expect 
outcomes in cases against individuals to be different than outcomes in 
cases against firms. 
Third, where the SEC’s case accompanies a criminal action for the 
same violation, that violation is likely more serious and the SEC’s odds 
of winning higher than when the SEC prosecutes alone. For existence of 
parallel criminal proceedings, I searched in Bloomberg Law for criminal 
actions against the defendant, and I reviewed indictments or criminal 
information documents for facts matching those in the SEC enforcement 
action. To code for whether the disposition in the SEC’s case was based 
on a parallel criminal case, I read the SEC’s dispositive motion (usually 
the motion for summary judgment) and the court opinion or 
memorandum explaining the decision granting the SEC’s motion. If the 
opinion mentioned that the defendant was collaterally estopped from 
disputing the facts, the case was coded as “based on” a criminal action. 
                                                     
241. In the older literature on statistics, the term independent variable is commonly used to refer 
to inputs that have some influence on the output or response variable. In the modern statistical 
literature, independent variables are called predictors, the term this paper adopts. See TREVOR 
HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: 
DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION 9 (2d ed. 2009). 
242. See Urska Velikonja, Waiving Disqualification: When Do Securities Violators Receive a 
Reprieve?, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1081, 1112 (2015) (reporting that individuals almost never receive 
waivers from automatic disqualification provisions). 
13 - Velikonja.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2017  3:14 PM 
2017] ARE THE SEC'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES BIASED? 355 
 
Finally, I included the subject matter categorization because the 
likelihood that the SEC will prevail varies significantly by the type of 
violation charged. Ceteris paribus, the SEC should be much more likely 
to prevail when the violation does not require a showing of mens rea 
(i.e., strict liability violations) than where the SEC must prove scienter. 
Many rules in the regulated securities industry are strict liability 
provisions, so one would expect the SEC’s success rate to be higher in 
actions against broker-dealers and investment advisers, for example, 
than in actions targeting insider trading. Case categorization is thus 
expected to be an important predictor of SEC success on the merits. 
To code for subject matter category, I used the SEC’s Reports for 
initial coding of subject matter. I coded cases in one of the six 
categories: securities offering, market manipulation, broker dealer, 
investment adviser, issuer reporting, and insider trading. Eight cases 
were coded as “other” because the SEC categorized them as other 
categories and there were not enough cases in each of the categories to 
yield meaningful results.243 Because the SEC categorizes 
inconsistently,244 I reviewed all enforcement actions and recoded a 
handful that were improperly categorized.245 
Table 5 below reports the SEC’s success by type of forum and subject 
matter category for the dataset labeled as Substantive Disposition in 
regressions reported in section II.C.3. The data includes dispositions by 
a third-party adjudicator after trial, on motion for summary judgment or 
summary disposition, and after a defendant’s motion to dismiss filed 
over the SEC’s objection. Table 5 does not include voluntary 
dismissals.246 The Table suggests that the SEC’s overall success rate is 
marginally greater before ALJs than in court but the difference is not 
statistically significant. What really makes a difference in the likelihood 
of success is the subject matter of the charged violation.247 The SEC 
loses more than 40% of contested insider trading actions and almost 
                                                     
243. Three cases involve transfer agents, two are miscellaneous, two involve municipal offering, 
and one involves the FCPA. In a separate set of regressions, I coded these eight cases for the 
categories to which they were closest. For example, as the SEC used to do in years past, I coded the 
FCPA case as an issuer disclosure case and the three transfer agent cases as investment adviser 
cases. I then re-ran all regressions and the results were essentially the same. 
244. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 954–57. 
245. All stop orders were categorized as “Securities Offering.” All 12(j) actions were coded as 
“Delinquent Filing” and excluded from the analysis. Contempt proceedings were coded as such and 
excluded from the analysis. In all, four contested actions were recoded or removed from the sample. 
246. A table of success rates by case category that includes voluntary dismissals by SEC motion 
is included in the Appendix. 
247. As noted above in section II.C.3.a, the difference is statistically significant. 
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30% of contested accounting fraud actions, but less than 10% of other 
actions. Since insider trading and accounting fraud cases are 
overwhelmingly filed in court, the SEC’s track record in court looks 
worse than its record before ALJs. 
 
Table 5: 
Summary of SEC Success by Case Category248 
 
 SEC 
win 
Number and win rate by category Total Overall 
SEC win 
rate 
Court SEC 
win % 
AP SEC 
win % 
Overall249 Yes 452 87.8% 150 89.8% 602 88.3% 
No 63  17  80  
Issuer 
Reporting 
Yes 35 68.6% 14 77.8% 49 71.0% 
No 16  4  20  
Broker-
Dealer 
Yes 23 95.8% 53 88.3% 76 90.5% 
No 1  7  8  
Investment 
Adviser 
Yes 54 94.7% 47 90.4% 101 92.7% 
No 3  5  8  
Market 
Manipulation 
Yes 54 94.7% 3 100% 57 95.0% 
No 3  0  3  
Securities 
Offering 
Yes 246 95.3% 21 100% 267 95.7% 
No 12  0  12  
The cases decided by district court judges and ALJs were otherwise 
similar along several dimensions. The median fine against a firm was 
zero in both venues and the median fine against an individual was 
around $200,000. Average fines and fines at the 75th percentile were 
larger in court, pushed up by securities offering cases.250 Almost 80% of 
cases resolved by a judge found the defendant to have violated scienter-
based provisions of securities laws; fewer than 50% of cases before 
ALJs found the defendant to have violated scienter-based provisions of 
                                                     
248.  Table 5 reports outcomes in cases decided by a judge (or jury) or an ALJ at any stage. It 
includes cases decided after a trial, by summary judgment or dismissal over the SEC’s objection. As 
noted above in section II.C.3.a, the difference is not statistically significant. 
249.  The Overall numbers include three transfer agent actions filed in AP, two municipal 
securities actions filed in court, one miscellaneous action filed in court and one in AP, and one 
FCPA action filed in court. 
250.  The Table includes dispositions at the motion to dismiss (not by consent), summary 
judgment, and trial stages (i.e., the same as Substantive Disposition dataset in Part II.C.3). The 
Table includes all actions filed in FY 2007–15 and resolved by September 15, 2016. 
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securities laws. On the other hand, almost 80% of defendants sued 
before ALJs were barred from the securities industry or from practicing 
before the Commission, whereas fewer than half of defendants sued in 
court were ultimately barred.251 
3. Regression Results 
Using the predictors described above, the analysis reported in this section 
tests whether the SEC’s likelihood of prevailing is significantly associated 
with where the action is litigated. The analysis includes controls for case 
category, the identity of the defendant (individual or firm), and whether the 
action was based on a criminal prosecution or accompanied by a parallel 
criminal action.252 
Table 6 below reports regression coefficients and measures of significance 
for four different data sets: the first, Substantive Disposition, includes all 
actions decided by a third-party adjudicator after trial, by summary 
disposition, or by motion to dismiss issued over the SEC’s objection. The 
regression dubbed Trial includes only actions decided after a full trial and 
does not include dismissals or summary dispositions. The data analyzed in the 
Trial regression are the most similar to the data that the Wall Street Journal 
relied on to claim that a disparity in outcomes exists. The difference is that the 
Wall Street Journal collected information on outcomes in all cases decided 
between 2010 and 2015, regardless of when the cases were initially filed, 
whereas the results below include only cases filed between 2007 and 2015 
and decided by September 15, 2016. 
The final regressions labeled Expanded include all actions included in the 
Substantive Disposition model, as well as voluntary dismissals where the SEC 
moved to dismiss its case against the defendant because its case was weak 
(based on contemporaneous statements or news stories).253 These regressions 
measure the SEC’s likelihood of prevailing depending on the forum in which 
the action is filed. Importantly, because they include voluntary dismissals by 
SEC motion, the regression models labeled Expanded do not measure 
whether ALJs are more likely to rule for the SEC than courts. 
As already noted, all regressions include cases that were filed in fiscal 
years 2007 to 2015 and were decided by September 15, 2016. For actions 
                                                     
251. I searched for follow-on proceedings targeting defendants sued in court. The count likely 
understates the share of court defendants facing bars because the SEC can take some time to initiate 
follow-on proceedings after successful litigation in court. 
252. In unreported regressions, I also controlled for the year in which the case was filed and the 
SEC Chair. Neither of the variables was statistically significant. 
253. In addition, they include dismissals where no information on the reason for dismissal was 
available. 
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filed in FY 2013 and later, more than ten percent of the cases filed in court 
remain ongoing, which could bias the result.254 To mitigate against the risk 
that defendants who litigate longer are more likely to prevail against the SEC, 
I also report regression coefficients based on the Expanded dataset including 
only cases filed in FY 2007 to 2012.255 
 
Table 6:  
Logistic Regression Coefficients256 
 
 Substantive 
Disposition 
Trials Expanded 
(incl. voluntary dismissal) 
 2007–15 2007–15 2007–15 2007–12 
ALJa     
Log odds 0.22 0.44 0.79* 0.76 
Wald (df=1) 0.33 0.99 5.01 2.52 
Odds ratio 1.25 1.55 2.20 2.13 
Firm     
Log odds 1.70** 1.74** 1.50** 1.55** 
Wald (df=1) 13.89 7.67 17.51 14.64 
Odds ratio 5.48 5.73 4.48 4.71 
Based on Criminal      
Log odds 1.87**  2.34** 2.37** 
Wald (df=1) 8.35  15.94 13.96 
Odds ratio 6.48  10.43 10.69 
Parallel Criminal a     
Log odds -0.54  -0.62† -0.71† 
Wald (df=1) 1.57  2.81 2.71 
Odds ratio 0.58  0.54 -0.49 
                                                     
254. Many of the cases that are ongoing are stayed pending the resolution of the parallel criminal 
case. As a result, it is not likely that the cases still pending are the ones the SEC is more likely to 
lose. If anything, the opposite is likely true. 
255. I also ran regressions using only cases filed in FY 2007 to 2012 in the Substantive 
Disposition and Trials datasets, and the results were similar to those reported for the full dataset: 
predictor Court was not significant in any model whereas other predictors were either significant or 
not, and with the same signal. 
256.  The dependent variable is whether SEC won on at least one of the counts (SEC win is coded 
as 1). The variable ALJ codes actions decided by ALJ as 1 and by court as 0. The variable Firm 
codes actions against firms as 1 and against individuals as 0; the variable Based on Criminal codes 
actions based on criminal convictions as 1. In variable Category, actions targeting securities offering 
violations are coded as the baseline. 
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 Substantive 
Disposition 
Trials Expanded 
(incl. voluntary dismissal) 
 2007–15 2007–15 2007–15 2007–12 
Category     
Wald (df=6) 68.06** 4.26 112.70** 98.29** 
Securities Offering 20.74** 19.83† 1.52 2.44† 
Wald  0.0 0.0 1.74 3.76 
Odds ratio n.a. n.a. 4.59 11.42 
Market Manipulation 2.93** 1.05† 1.70 2.52† 
Wald  51.28 2.97 1.80 3.25 
Odds ratio  2.85 5.50 12.43 
Investment Adviser 2.90** 1.04 0.69 1.35 
Wald  19.51 1.43 0.35 1.15 
Odds ratio  2.83 1.99 3.85 
Broker Dealer 2.22** 0.98 0.18 0.77 
Wald 20.67 2.16 0.024 0.39 
Odds ratio  2.66 1.12 2.15 
Issuer Reporting 2.06** 0.99 -0.85 -0.51 
Wald 14.95 2.35 0.56 0.18 
Odds ratio  2.68 0.43 0.60 
Insider Trading 0.83* 0.47 -1.87 -1.42 
Wald 4.51 0.66 2.68 1.36 
Odds ratio  1.61 0.15 0.24 
Pseudo R2 0.297 0.150 0.403 0.461 
N 682 290 728 571 
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; †p<0.1 
a None of the dispositions at trial were based on a criminal conviction or plea, so the 
predictor is not included in the regression analysis. 
 
Table 6 reports for each predictor three statistics generated by the 
logistic regression model. The first is a log odds coefficient, the second 
the Wald statistic, and the third an odds ratio. The log odds coefficient is 
a logarithmic measure of association between the response variable (i.e., 
SEC success) and the predictor. The Wald statistic is a measure of 
statistical significance: it tells one whether the observed association is so 
large that it is unlikely to appear by chance. The higher the Wald 
statistic, the more likely that the observed association between the two 
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variables is real.257 The odds ratio is a more useful measure than the log 
odds coefficient: it quantifies the association. It is a relative measure of 
the effect, comparing the relative likelihood of success before an ALJ 
with the relative likelihood of success in court. For example, an odds 
ratio of 5.48 for the predictor Firm in the Substantive Disposition model 
implies that the SEC is 5.48-times as likely to prevail against a firm than 
against an individual defendant, all else being equal. 
A positive log odds coefficient implies that the predictor and the 
response variable are positively correlated; a negative number suggests a 
negative correlation. All predictors used in the regression models are 
categorical. Three—ALJ, Firm, and Based on Criminal—are binary, 
where the observation takes on one of two values (i.e., ALJ or court, 
individual or firm, convicted or not). For each of the predictors, one of 
the options was chosen as the baseline. A logistic regression reports log 
odds coefficients as compared with a baseline, so the choice of baseline 
matters.258 In the models reported above, the baseline value for the 
predictor Firm was litigation against a firm. Thus, the reported log odds 
coefficients measure the relationship between an SEC win in a case 
against a firm as compared with litigation against an individual. A 
positive coefficient suggests that the SEC is more likely to win against a 
firm than against an individual defendant, all else being equal. Similarly, 
the log odds coefficients in the regression model Trial for predictors 
ALJ and Based on Criminal are positive; given the selected baselines 
(litigation in court and no conviction, respectively), the SEC is more 
likely to prevail in a case filed before an ALJ and in an action against a 
defendant convicted for the same violation. The SEC is less likely to 
prevail when the action is accompanied by a parallel criminal case; this 
is what one might call the Newman effect. Many insider trading cases 
are accompanied by, but not based on, criminal indictments that are later 
dismissed. 
The regression also includes the subject matter category as a fixed 
effect. Category is a qualitative predictor. The subject matters for 
enforcement actions are a finite set and there is no ordering between 
classes: an action for insider trading is not better or worse than an action 
for market manipulation. Cases categorized as “other” are used as the 
baseline to compare against other types of cases. 
                                                     
257. See GARETH JAMES, DANIELA WITTEN, TREVOR HASTIE & ROBERT TIBSHIRANI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL LEARNING 134 (2015). 
258. It does not matter for the calculation which is chosen as the baseline; the baseline only 
matters in interpretation and only because it determines whether the log odds coefficient is positive 
or negative. See HASTIE, THIBSHIRANI & FRIEDMAN, supra note 241, at 119. 
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As is common in studies reporting the results of a statistical analysis, 
coefficients that are statistically significant are marked with asterisks.259 
Notably, in the models most similar to the results reported in the Wall 
Street Journal, labeled Trials and Substantive Disposition, the variable 
ALJ is not statistically significant. In other words, even though the log 
odds coefficient for the predictor ALJ is positive in both models, the 
result does not allow one to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
association between the type of forum in which an action is filed and 
case outcome. Contrary to the claims advanced by the Wall Street 
Journal,260 the data analyzed do not support the conclusion that the SEC 
is more likely to win at trial decided by an ALJ than in one decided by a 
federal district judge once one controls for case category, the nature of 
the defendant, and the existence of parallel criminal proceedings. 
What matters in adjudicated cases is not where the case is litigated but 
whether the targeted defendant is an individual and, to a lesser extent, 
what type of violation is charged.261 The SEC is significantly less likely 
to prevail against individual defendants and against defendants targeted 
for insider trading and issuer reporting.262 
The only model in which the type of forum is significantly associated 
with case outcomes is the third model labeled Expanded. Both the third 
and fourth columns include voluntary dismissals by the SEC. In the 
Expanded model that includes all contested cases filed between 2007 
and 2015, the variable ALJ is statistically significant at p<0.05.263 
Holding other predictors constant, the SEC is statistically significantly 
more likely to win on at least one count when the case is filed in the 
administrative forum. 
Even this result should be taken with reservations. Venue does not 
matter for cases decided by a judge or an ALJ; it is only significant when 
voluntary dismissals are included. This requires two additional caveats. 
                                                     
259. One asterisk signals that the result is significant at p<0.05, which means that there is less 
than a 5% chance that there is no relationship between the response (SEC win) and the predictor 
(e.g., litigation in court). Two asterisks signal that the result is significant at p<0.01, which implies 
that there is less than a 1% chance that there is no relationship between the response and the 
predictor. 
260. See Eaglesham, supra note 14; Eaglesham, supra note 114. 
261. Using odds ratios reported in Table 6, the SEC is more than five times more likely to win 
when the defendant is a firm than when the defendant is an individual. 
262. Using odds ratios reported in Table 6, compared with securities offering cases, the SEC is 
seventeen times less likely to prevail on a dispositive motion in insider trading cases and eight-times 
less likely to prevail in issuer reporting cases. 
263. Note that if cases filed in FY 2012 are included as well, the variable Court is not statistically 
significant. 
13 - Velikonja.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2017  3:14 PM 
362 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:315 
 
First, for many voluntary dismissals, conclusive contemporaneous 
evidence on why the case was dismissed is not available. When in doubt, 
the voluntary dismissal was coded as a defendant win.264 To the extent 
some of these were not true wins, the result could be entirely due to 
coding error.265 Second, the venue is not significant when cases filed 
after 2012 are excluded. Although the coefficients do not change much, 
the power of the test declines with a smaller sample. 
This result remains unchanged in unreported models using fixed 
effects for the year in which the action was filed and for the SEC chair. 
In other words, individuals targeted in insider trading and issuer 
reporting actions are consistently more likely than other defendants to 
prevail against the SEC. Defendants convicted of crimes are 
significantly less likely to prevail against the SEC. The SEC has 
consistently filed cases for insider trading and issuers reporting in court. 
Contrary to the oft-repeated claims of statistical disparity, these results 
do not support the conclusion that defendants are more likely to win at 
trial in court than before ALJs, nor do they suggest that judges are more 
likely to rule for defendants than are ALJs. The analysis does suggest a 
possibility that defendants might fare better when the SEC targets them 
in court than before ALJs, but only if the SEC dismisses the case 
voluntarily, not if the case goes to a decision by a judge or an ALJ. 
III. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS 
The statistical analysis reported in Part II suggests that the Wall Street 
Journal’s data on which many advocates of reform have relied cannot be 
used to support the claim that the SEC is more likely to prevail when it 
litigates before ALJs. At the same time, the findings reported in this 
Article do not suggest that the type of forum is irrelevant. The SEC’s 
expanded jurisdiction is new and too many of the post-Dodd-Frank cases 
are still ongoing, so none of the regressions validly test only post-Dodd-
Frank data. 
The gold standard in empirical studies is a double-blind randomized 
controlled experiment. Such experiments divide the sample into two 
groups that are similar along relevant dimensions, randomly assign one 
group to treatment (in this case, adjudication by ALJ), and observe 
whether treatment is correlated with different outcomes as compared 
                                                     
264. This includes about half of voluntary dismissals coded as defendant wins. 
265. I ran a robustness check where the twenty voluntary dismissals without available evidence as 
to why they were dismissed were excluded from the model. The result was not statistically 
significant (log odds = 0.52; Wald = 2.06; odds ratio = 1.69). 
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with the control group.266 Unfortunately, a double-blind study of 
outcomes in securities enforcement actions based on the type of forum is 
impossible because the SEC, as well as the ALJ or the judge deciding 
the case, know that the SEC chose to file the case in their forum. 
And so, evidence of disparities must come from an observational 
study like the one printed in the Wall Street Journal and the one reported 
in this Article. Carefully designed observational studies can be used to 
identify significant associations between variables of interest, but trained 
statisticians caution users from drawing causal inferences based on 
observational studies. 
This Article has catalogued the many problems with the Wall Street 
Journal’s report. But the empirical analysis in Part II, too, has significant 
limitations. This Part discusses two limitations: omitted variable bias 
and selection bias. It concludes with recommendations for further 
research. 
A. The Missing Pieces: Omitted Variables and Selection Bias 
The conclusion offered in section II.C.3 that the type of forum does 
not matter assumes that the included predictors capture the relevant 
characteristics of cases filed in either forum. If so, there is no robust 
statistically significant association between the forum in which an SEC 
enforcement action is litigated and the defendant’s success against the 
SEC. 
This assumption is certainly not satisfied. The regression models 
reported above omit important variables. Representation might matter: 
pro se defendants may be more likely to lose than those represented by 
counsel, in particular if counsel is experienced.267 The ALJ or federal 
judge deciding the case might matter, or the SEC regional office that 
conducted the investigation. One could collect more data, but none of 
this is likely to be worth the effort because the two most important 
characteristics that are omitted, case quality and the SEC’s perception of 
case quality, are either not easily measured or are not observable. 
The type of forum where the case is litigated is not random. The SEC 
selects which cases to litigate in court and which ones to file in the 
administrative forum, so selection bias is a significant concern. It is 
possible that the SEC files in the administrative forum cases that it 
                                                     
266. See John Concato, Nirav Shah & Ralph I. Horwitz, Randomized, Controlled Trials, 
Observational Studies, and the Hierarchy of Research Designs, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1887 (2000) 
(demonstrating the superiority of randomized double blind control trials over observational studies). 
267. See Zaring, supra note 20, at 1179 tbl.1. 
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believes it could not win in court—the charge lobbed by the Wall Street 
Journal.268 If so, one would expect the SEC to win less often before 
ALJs than in court, assuming all else is equal.269 Then, the finding of no 
disparity in success rates between the two different forums would be 
significant and important. It would suggest that the proverbial deck is 
stacked in favor of the SEC in administrative proceedings.270 
Unfortunately, the complaints and the OIPs do not supply enough 
information to code consistently for case quality, and the cases where 
consistent coding could be possible, such as insider trading, are virtually 
all filed in court. External proxies, such as stock price movement on 
announcement of detected violation,271 could be useful as a measure of 
the seriousness of the violation. But, stock-price data is limited to public 
firms, which represent only four percent of SEC enforcement actions 
and an even smaller slice of contested actions,272 so it is not useful as a 
general measure of case quality. Moreover, if the concern is the SEC’s 
opportunistic forum selection, then we would need a variable to measure 
the enforcement staff’s perception of case quality. Unfortunately, that, 
too, is not observable at present. 
There is a second selection bias effect that renders win ratios of 
limited value in assessing the fairness of SEC enforcement. Despite the 
interest in litigated cases, it is far more common for defendants to settle 
with the SEC. Over the period studied, about 40% of cases were filed as 
settled actions, and another 35% were settled during the proceedings.273 
But the ratio of settled cases from initiation is not stable. During the 
study period, the rate varied from a low of 32% in FY 2009 to a high of 
48% in FY 2014. If the odds that a case will settle before the SEC files 
an enforcement action have changed, the proportion and thus the mix of 
cases that are contested has changed, too. In addition, the relative shares 
                                                     
268. See Eaglesham, supra note 14. 
269. That is, assuming that success rates for like cases are the same in court and before ALJs. 
270. Alternately, it is also possible that the SEC files easier cases or cases that it is ex ante more 
likely to win in the administrative forum. In that case, the finding of no disparity would suggest that 
ALJs are biased against the SEC. 
271. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Proxies and Databases in Financial Misconduct Research 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112569 [https:// 
perma.cc/ZPG6-8KEA] (discussing the use of stock market information in studies of financial 
misreporting). 
272. See STEPHEN CHOI, SARA E. GILLEY, AND DAVID F. MARCUS, NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR 
LAW & BUS. AND CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AGAINST PUBLIC 
COMPANY DEFENDANTS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, at 2 (2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/ 
default/files/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-FY2010-FY2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJE-MVNB]. 
273. The ratio for settled cases is based on cases that have been resolved and does not include 
ongoing cases. See discussion supra section II.C.1. 
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of settled actions filed in different venues have not remained stable. 
Fewer of the cases filed in court are filed as settled cases: 30% in FY 
2007 and 15% in FY 2015. On the other hand, the relative share of cases 
filed as settled in the administrative forum has remained stable at 
80%.274 
Defendants’ willingness to settle may be affected by their perception 
that ALJs are less fair.275 The SEC has reportedly threatened 
investigated parties with litigation before ALJs if they are unwilling to 
settle.276 As a result, more parties might be settling post-Dodd-Frank 
than before and thus the types of cases that are adjudicated and the 
forum in which they are adjudicated have changed. At the same time, at 
least some defendants’ willingness to settle may have declined after the 
Wall Street Journal’s reporting.277 As some defendants have succeeded 
in lawsuits seeking to enjoin administrative proceedings, others may 
have been encouraged to contest charges instead of settling. If the types 
of cases that are contested keep changing, any long-term analysis of case 
outcomes is problematic unless we could capture relevant characteristics 
to control for such changes. 
The SEC’s enforcement practices, too, have changed over time. 
Between 2007 and 2015, the SEC lived through three Chairs with vastly 
different priorities and underwent a serious restructuring of its 
Enforcement Division.278 The restructuring reportedly improved the 
morale of employees; it also changed the level of enforcement 
activity.279 Finally, the SEC has changed where it files contested 
cases.280 While absolute numbers are a single figure, success rate is a 
ratio comprised of two numbers: the numerator and the denominator. 
                                                     
274. There was a decline in 2012 and 2013 to 61% and 65%, respectively. Data on file with 
author. 
275. See Brian Mahoney, SEC Could Bring More Insider Trading Cases In-House, LAW360 
(June 11, 2014, 6:53 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/547183/sec-couldbring-more-insider-
trading-cases-in-house [https://perma.cc/V7V8-8TVQ]. 
276. See id. (quoting SEC Enforcement Director Ceresney as saying the SEC “threatened 
administrative proceedings” and the defendant settled). 
277. This can be true even if the overall settlement rate increased. Since 2013, the SEC has 
brought a considerable number of sweeps targeting large groups of defendants for similar violations. 
Such defendants invariably settle, which increases both the numerator and the denominator to 
calculate the ratio of cases that are filed as settled actions. A settlement ratio that includes sweeps 
can mask the fact that defendants other than those targeted in sweeps are less likely to settle. 
278. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-358, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION: GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UTILIZATION OF 
RESOURCES IN THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT (2009). 
279. See id. 
280. See Eaglesham, supra note 122. 
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One can change the success rate by changing either the number of cases 
brought, the number of successes, or both. As such, success rates are 
more vulnerable to small changes in inputs and the biases discussed 
above. 
All of these factors suggest that success rates are not a useful measure 
of fairness in SEC enforcement. It is unfortunate that they have become 
one, and even more unfortunate that the Wall Street Journal report that 
stirred the controversy was done so poorly and over-claimed so 
extensively. 
B. Beyond the Empirics 
The Wall Street Journal’s report can serve as a useful cautionary tale. 
It combined bold claims and seemingly straightforward data analysis to 
make the case that the SEC was treating defendants unfairly. It 
confirmed the perceptions that the SEC was a sore loser and was 
changing the rules of the game to ensure it would win in the future. 
The perception that ALJs supply a lesser form of fairness is likely to 
persist.281 After the analysis offered in this Article, one would hope that 
better-researched and supported empirical analyses will replace news 
stories in the ongoing debate about the fairness of the administrative 
forum. Because empirical evidence is lacking, the debate about the 
fairness of administrative adjudication and the appropriate remedies 
should be held on the policy merits and demerits. There are good and 
bad arguments advanced by both the SEC and its critics. What the 
battling sides hopefully will accept is that the data in this debate is no 
trump card. 
The ultimate result might be that the SEC amends procedural rules 
before ALJs again to model them more closely on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as some commentators have proposed.282 It might be to 
enable courts to decide what forum is most appropriate to resolve an 
SEC enforcement action.283 But that is unlikely to satisfy everyone. Both 
                                                     
281. See, e.g., McLucas & Martens, supra note 6, at A17 (“Democratic self-governance requires 
that the governed be generally convinced of the system’s evenhandedness. We are concerned that 
the SEC is damaging the perceived legitimacy of how the agency uses its enforcement power.”); 
Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the “SEC Speaks” Conference 2015: A Fair, 
Orderly and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-
spchcmsp.html [https://perma.cc/RT5C-F6P7] (“To avoid the perception that the Commission is 
taking its tougher cases to its in-house judges, and to ensure that all are treated fairly and equally, 
the Commission should set out and implement guidelines for determining which cases are brought 
in administrative proceedings and which in federal courts.”). 
282. See, e.g., Bondi, Ortiz & Wheatley, supra note 29; Zornow, supra note 132. 
283. See Grundfest, supra note 30. 
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bills introduced in Congress include removal provisions that would 
entitle defendants to remove any action to federal district court and raise 
the burden of persuasion if the case were to stay in the administrative 
forum.284 Practitioners have proposed that the Commission “bring all but 
its most routine cases in federal court.”285 
These proposals are associated with significant costs that could 
surpass any purported benefits.286 Removing most cases to court would 
increase the workload for and stress the already overburdened federal 
judiciary287 without meaningfully improving either defendants’ 
procedural protections or their likelihood of success. Giving defendants 
the incentive to remove cases to court would drain the SEC’s resources, 
thus reducing overall enforcement levels unless Congress were to 
appropriate additional funds. In addition, in-court adjudication could 
introduce errors as well. Complex regulatory matters may be beyond the 
capacity of even the most dedicated layperson jurors, and so removing 
securities enforcement actions to the courts could reduce the 
predictability of outcomes.288 On the other hand, unsettled legal 
questions are perhaps better left to federal judges. The choice of forum 
involves trade-offs, and no single type of forum is best for all types of 
disputes brought by a regulator with broad enforcement authority such as 
the SEC. 
CONCLUSION 
It is hardly news that a news story got an important fact wrong. The 
Wall Street Journal’s story is unusual in the significant influence that it 
has had on the law and the practice of securities enforcement. Many of 
the power players in securities regulation have referenced the alleged 
disparity, including judges deciding securities cases, a sitting SEC 
Commissioner, and congressmen advancing statutory amendments. The 
reported disparity led the SEC itself to amend its Rules of Practice. 
Despite the effort, the SEC’s administrative adjudication continues to 
                                                     
284. See discussion supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
285. Brune, supra note 29, at 5. 
286. See Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1184. 
287. See Peter J. Henning, Reforming the SEC’s Administrative Process, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/business/dealbook/reforming-the-secs-administrative-
process.html [https://perma.cc/8S9Z-RR56] (speculating that more cases would be filed in court). 
288. See generally Davison et al., supra note 22, at 104 (observing that complex issues can be 
“outside the experience and understanding of a typical layperson jury”). 
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face scrutiny. This is a remarkable feat for any empirical study, let alone 
a seriously deficient one. 
This Article offers a more careful and comprehensive alternative 
analysis of SEC success rates. It reports that there is no robust 
correlation between the selected forum and case outcome. This finding 
does not imply that the type of forum in which the SEC litigates does not 
matter. Rather, there are significant empirical obstacles to finding any 
useful results by comparing case outcomes. 
The controversy about the fairness of SEC enforcement in the 
administrative forum will no doubt continue. By discrediting the data 
that many of the SEC’s critics have used to buttress their claims, this 
Article hopes that the debate can proceed at a lower volume and offer 
more measured solutions than some of the proposals advanced thus far. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 7:  
Success by Case Category,  
Including Voluntary Dismissals (Expanded) 
 
 SEC 
win 
Number and win rate by category  Total Overall 
SEC win 
rate 
Court SEC 
win % 
AP SEC 
win % 
Overall Yes 451 80.5% 150 89.3% 601 82.6% 
No 109  18  127  
Insider 
Trading 
Yes 38 40.9% 2 50.0% 40 41.2% 
No 55  2  57  
Issuer 
Reporting 
Yes 35 56.5% 14 77.8% 49 61.1% 
No 27  4  31  
Broker-
Dealer 
Yes 23 85.2% 53 88.3% 76 87.4% 
No 4  7  11  
Investment 
Adviser 
Yes 54 93.1% 47 90.4% 101 91.2% 
No 4  5  9  
Market 
Manipulation 
Yes 54 94.7% 3 100% 57 95.0% 
No 3  0  3  
Securities 
Offering 
Yes 246 94.3% 21 100% 267 94.7% 
No 15  0  15  
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Table 8:  
Success by Case Category after Trial or ALJ Initial Decision289 
 
 SEC 
win 
Number and win rate by category  Total Overall 
SEC win 
rate 
Court SEC 
win % 
AP SEC 
win % 
Overall Yes 105 82.7% 146 89.6% 251 86.6% 
No 22  17  39  
Insider 
Trading 
Yes 22 73.3% 2 66.7% 24 72.7% 
No 8  1  9  
Issuer 
Reporting 
Yes 18 81.8% 14 77.8% 32 80.0% 
No 4  4  8  
Broker-
Dealer 
Yes 9 90.0% 53 88.3% 62 88.6% 
No 1  7  8  
Investment 
Adviser 
Yes 11 91.7% 43 89.6% 54 90.0% 
No 1  5  6  
Market 
Manipulation 
Yes 11 84.6% 3 100% 14 87.5% 
No 2  0  2  
Securities 
Offering 
Yes 34 85.0% 19 100% 53 89.8% 
No 6  0  6  
 
 
                                                     
289.  The Table includes dispositions after jury or bench trial for cases filed in court and 
dispositions of ALJ initial decision after a hearing (not including cases decided by default) (i.e., the 
same as Reduced dataset in section II.C.3). 
